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INTRODUCTION 
The lack of legitimate populace-government relations in a state has 
become an imperative concern and a circumstance that can make the 
reasons for a war or intervention more compelling under international 
law and politics. 1 Foreign military support was provided to insurgents 
t M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. 
International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for 
Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, 
American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law 
courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami. 
1. Jeff McMahan, The Morality of Military Occupation, 31 LOY. L.A. lNT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 7, 7 (2009) (noting that while there are a bountiful number of books written on just 
war, there are fewer works written on occupation even though the latter is a critical and 
related topic). 
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to foster violent uprisings in Libya and the U.S. military executed 
bombing operations that facilitated the overthrow of the 42-year dictator 
Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011.2 The uprising in Syria against President 
Bashar al-Assad, whose family has controlled the country since 1970,3 
continued for over two years and killed 160,000 through May 2014,4 but 
there was no overt foreign intervention. Populist division remains in 
Ukraine among those who prefer closer relations with Western Europe 
and those who desire tighter relations with Russia, with foreign powers 
selecting sides to support their respective political alliance but without 
external powers officially announcing an intention to militarily 
intervene. 5 Overt occupation is found in the case of Israel occupying 
Palestinian territories, with relations periodically erupting into armed 
conflict.6 U.S. troops exited Iraq in December 2011 after an eight-year 
occupation and after the Bush White House's Coalition Provisional 
Authority ("CPA") dictated legal reforms and new institutions of 
government, 7 ostensibly postulating that the institutions would furnish 
the infrastructure for peaceful relations, but instead Iraq is in danger of 
splintering. 
These cases illustrate that the international community can be 
divided with varying levels of support for intervention on behalf of 
either a regime or opposing non-government actors. The depth of 
2. Joshua Norman, The World's Enduring Dictators: Muammar Qaddafi, Libya, CBS 
NEWS (Aug. 21, 2011, 7:49 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-worlds-
enduring-dictators-muammar-qaddafi-libya/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
3. Profile: Syria's Ruling Baath Party, BBC (July 9, 2012, 10:30 AM), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
4. Faith Karimi & Salma Abdelaziz, Syria Civil War Death Top 160,000, Opposition 
Group Says, CNN (May 20, 2014, 6:19 AM), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/world/meast/syria-civil-war/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
5. Landside Crimea Vote To Split From Ukraine, SKY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:11 
AM), available at http://news.sky.com/story/1226921/landslide-crimea-vote-to-split-from-
ukraine (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting that Crimean people, who are 58% ethnic 
Russian, voted 97% in favor of becoming part of Russia in a referendum vote because of 
their displeasure with the government in Kiev). When Russia began to increase 
involvement in other parts of eastern Ukraine and supported Ukrainian rebels, the US voiced 
more objections and placed a series of sanctions on Russia. 
6. Ashley Fantz, Why are so Many Civilians Dying in Hamas-Israel War?, CNN (Aug. 
4, 2014, 9:16 AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/world/meast/gaza-israel-
why-civilian-deaths/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that the most recent fighting 
began in July 2014 with the Israeli Defense force invading Gaza and that during the first 
month of fighting, 1,800 Palestinian were killed (including 300 children) and 10,000 
wounded and 64 Israeli soldiers and three Israeli civilians were killed). 
7. Mark Landler, US. Troops to Leave Iraq by Year's End, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/middleeast 
/president-obama-announces-end-of-war-in-iraq.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015). 
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international support may be amalgamated by factors such as the extent 
that curbing human rights violations is needed, whether the interest in 
humanitarian intervention sufficiently outweighs the cost of incursion 
on sovereignty, whether foreign intervention can actually effectively 
relieve the adverse conditions, and the stake in diplomatic relations with 
the regime in question. The outcome of the case of Iraq, due to the 
recent insurgency, updates the lessons for the manner in which an 
occupier should be permitted to impose institutional and legal reforms 
that endeavor to modify government-societal relations. The Bush White 
House's CPA unilaterally imposed dictates that were heavily criticized 
by Iraqis and the international community, 8 but fundamental to the lack 
of long-term success is an imperative distinction between reforms that 
were permissible and essential under occupation law and those 
modifications that may have set a foundation for blowback and abetted 
the recent crisis. 
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was an Iraqi defector-exile 
for 23 years prior to the 2003 invasion9 and has been prime minister for 
eight years which means that not long after he reentered Iraq, Maliki 
became prime minister and has held that position ever since. Maliki 
alienated Kurds and Sunnis, 10 was corrupt, deemed himself the 
"preeminent military leader," suppressed peaceful protests with his 
security services, called protesters terrorists, hired thugs to beat and kill 
dissenters, and arrested and tortured thousands of objectors until 
protests ended. 1 1 Remarking about Maliki' s special forces, Zaid Al Ali 
8. See Robert Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin of the CPA: An Attribute of the Unitary 
Executive, 51 WrLLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2015) (manuscript at 279-98) 
[hereinafter Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin]; see also infra Part II (C)(i). 
9. Jason Burke, Iraq: How Much is the Divisive Approach of Maliki Responsible for 
the Turmoil?, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2014, 1 :30 AM), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/15/nouri-al-maliki-is-he-the-man-to-
blame-in-iraq (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
l 0. See Jay Solomon & Matt Bradley, Iraqi Parties Pressure Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki to Step Down, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2014), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-s-kerry-arrives-in-baghdad-for-meeting-with-prime-
minister-maliki-1403508006 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
11. Zaid Al-Ali, How Maliki Ruined Iraq, FOREIGN PoL'Y (June 19, 2014), available at 
http: //www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/19/how_maliki_ruined_iraq_armed_forces_i 
sis (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Sandy Berger, US. Must Forge New Ties with Iraq to Tackle 
ISIS Threat, TIME (Aug. 17, 2014), available at http://time.com/3130983/sandy-berger-
iraq-isis-maliki/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (national security advisor during the Clinton 
administration stating that "Maliki had governed in such an overtly anti-Sunni fashion that 
the Sunni tribes in the north had come to hate him more than they feared ISIS."); Lord 
Maginnis, A Fictitious !SIL to Scare Us Away From the Truth in Iraq, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 15, 2014), available at http: //www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lord-maginnis/iraq-
isil_b_5494529.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (U.K. House of Lords member stating that 
3
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writes: "Groups of young men were arrested in waves, often in the 
middle of the night, and would be wisked to secret jails, often never to 
be seen again." 12 A member of the U.K. House of Lords recently wrote 
that "Maliki has created a Mafia-like network of criminals and assassins 
to eliminate the voice of opposition at every level" and estimated that an 
average of a thousand Iraqis have been killed every month over the past 
decade by these assassins. 13 Political leaders called for the formation of 
a new and inclusive Iraqi govemment. 14 
Maliki reluctantly resigned after two months of urging, 15 but 
several days later was appointed to the position of vice president. 16 
Meanwhile, the group that led the insurgency to end Maliki' s rule has 
been labeled brutal zealots, 17 leaders of a larger movement of Sunni 
"revolutionaries,"18 and a group that is seeking to regain oil production 
facilities, many of which are now operated by foreign multinationals. 19 
"Corruption in the [Iraqi] government and those affiliated to the government is almost 
unimaginable with billions of dollar embezzled and laundered, thus crippling the country's 
economy."). 
12. Al-Ali, supra note 11. 
13. Maginnis, supra note 11. 
14. Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, US. Signals Iraq's Maliki Should Go, WALL ST. J. 
(June 19, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signals-1403137521 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2015) ("The Obama administration is signaling that it wants a new 
government in Iraq without Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki"); Mark Tran, Iraqi Prime 
Minister Reiects Pleas for Government of 'National Salvation', GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014), 
avai /able at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/25/iraqi-prime-minister-rejects-
calls-salvation-government (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
stating "We need a government in Iraq that embraces all parts of the population. For years 
this has not happened and because of this the pressure needs to be raised."). 
15. Iraq Crisis: Maliki Quits as PM to End Deadlock, BBC (Aug. 15, 2014), available 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28798033 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
16. See What Do Iraqi Leaders Hope to Hear From Obama 's Strategy?, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Sept. 10, 2014), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/iraqi-leaders-
hope-hear-obamas-strategy/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
17. Leon Watson, Jihadi Terror Group PLC: ISIS Zealots Log Assassination, Suicide 
Missions and Bombings in Annual Report for Financial Backers, DAILY MAIL (June 17, 
2014), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-266 l 007 /15-000-fighters-1-
000-assassinations-4-000-IEDs-How-Isis-publishes-annual-report-detailing-reign-terror-
Middle-East.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
18. Scott Peterson, Maliki or Isis? Neither Looks Good to Sunni Awakening Veterans, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0618/Maliki-or-ISIS-Neither-looks-
good-to-Sunni-Awakening-veterans (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that "the stunning 
ISIS advance is riding what some top Sunni politicians- echoed by local players like 
Abu Omar- say is a much wider "revolution" against the unabashedly Shiite-first 
policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki."). 
19. Iraq Crisis: Baghdad Requests US Air Strikes Against Sunni Militants- Live, 
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-
live/2014/jun/ 18/iraq-crisis-maliki-sacks-officers-and-cal ls-for-national-unity-live-updates 
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Consequently, the eruption of violence in Iraq, just two years after the 
U.S. military departed, could also be perceived as an insurgency ignited 
by the existence of institutions that the Bush administration imposed 
and a continuation of rule under those institutions by an Iraqi exile who 
has evoked vehement opposition and has confronted insurmountable 
tribulation over his obligation to respect the human rights of citizens. 
To assess the broad question of the balance between foreign 
powers respecting sovereignty and choosing to pressure or direct 
reforms on an occupied population, this article assesses how the Bush 
White House's CPA ordered many legitimate reforms but so 
expansively discerned its own authority that the recent backlash of 
violence jeopardized the efficacy of the permissible reforms. Hence, 
this recent precedent is evidence that an occupier should ensure that 
anything other than sanctioned reforms should be a byproduct of the 
sovereign choice of citizens in an occupied territory. Part II discusses 
competing principles of occupation law along an historical spectrum 
and rectifies how some departure in the strictness of occupation law is 
justified by new international law principles. Part III addresses how the 
Bush Administration's CPA presumed that dictated reforms were a 
product of Iraqi democratic control, which is inaccurate and inconsistent 
with the language of Security Council mandates. Part IV considers the 
opposing interpretations of the current state of occupation law and 
maintains that the precedent of Iraq affirms that the customary law of 
occupation should reside precisely where the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions placed it, except with the accommodation for 
institutionalizing human rights norms and principles of representative 
government. Part V concludes by emphasizing that excessive 
transgressions by a foreign power that deeply and callously transplant 
foreign institutions during an occupation can violate rules of occupation 
law, undermine the universal humanitarian interest at stake with a 
foreign intervention, and beget a backlash that nullifies the entire reason 
for the intervention. 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Nafeez Ahmed, Iraq Blowback: Isis Rise Manufactured by 
Insatiable Oil Addition, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/ 16/blowback-isis-iraq-
manufactured-oil-addiction (last visited Apr. I , 2015) ("The meteoric rise of Isis is a 
predictable consequence of a longstanding US-led geostrategy in the Middle East that has 
seen tyrants and terrorists as tools to expedite access to regional oil and gas resources"). 
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I. COMPETING PRINCIPLES OF OCCUPATION 
There are two polar conceptions of a belligerent military 
occupation authority-one that is archaic and another that is 
contemporary treaty law-and an apparent gray area that many 
commentators have contended exists following the occupation of Iraq. 20 
This Part addresses distinctions between the extremes and punctuates 
that the obscure zone can be partially elucidated by recognizing the 
applicability of universal human rights standards and the preference for 
ensuring that there is a virtuous nexus between the governor and the 
governed. 
The first conception is historical conquest, which presumed that 
military occupation imparted an authority to govern21 and to impose 
rules on foreign lands, even if those institutions would be anathema to 
the local population.22 Alexander the Great panegyrized the principle 
that conquerors dictated law on the defeated and assumed that 
subjugated people were mandated to obediently adhere to occupier 
imposed laws. 23 The British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other 
colonial powers, all imposed rules in foreign lands, including with the 
objective of retaining control over territorial possessions. 24 The 
international law norm that permitted the colonial power to subjugate 
and attain title to territory by conquest was the practice of rule by the 
mighty.25 
The U.S. Supreme Court also generally followed this precedent in 
the case of the South's attempted succession during the Civil War, but 
the distinction was that a foreign sovereign was not imposing rule, but 
instead the national government was wielding sovereignty over a 
territory that was already locally prescribed. The Union's temporary 
subjugation sought to terminate rivalries and feuding with the mission 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 ( 1878). 
22. JANE STROM SETH, DA YID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? 
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 195 (2006). 
23. James Thuo Gathii, Commerce, Conquest, and Wartime Confiscation, 31 BROOK. 
J. INT'L L. 709, 730 (2006) (noting that the Roman Empire expanded pursuant to the 
principle that it was an "indubitable right of war, for the conqueror to impose whatever 
terms he pleased upon the conquered."). 
24. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L. 
Rev. 1159, 1171-72 (2005) (stating that European powers "established nominally 
independent puppet-states" and used straight-forward colonial regimes in Africa, Asia, and 
South Asia). 
25. Robert Bejesky, Currency Cooperation and Sovereign Financial Obligations, 24 
FLA. J. lNT'L L. 91, 143-44 (2012). 
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of preserving unification of the United States. 26 The Supreme Court 
held that Americans on opposing sides temporarily became enemies to 
each other 27 until relations could be permanently changed by 
government reform. 28 While reforms were being imposed, the 
occupying military possessed immunity from local civil and criminal 
laws, 29 which is similar to the terms of some contemporary Status of 
Force Agreements that allow one state's military to operate within 
another sovereign territory. The Supreme Court followed the then-
dominant precedent under international law, which was that the military 
occupier bore the right to govern the occupied territory, enact laws, and 
even ensure that the relationship between the occupied population and 
the unlawfully acting Confederate government would be severed. 30 
Over the past century, international law has cashiered the historical 
practice of consecrating rule by the mighty belligerent and has rebuked 
the right of an occupier to impose institutional reform on a subjugated 
population. The universally accepted right of self-determination under 
international law31 is the guiding norm that foremost undergirds the law 
of occupation. 32 Detailed rules of occupation law are found in the 
Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1949, and 
customary international law, 33 and the rules automatically apply as soon 
as territory is placed under the authority of an invading hostile 
26. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879) (explaining that the immunity for the 
occupier is due to the need to uphold the "efficacy of the army as a hostile force."). 
27. Id. at 164 ("The people of the loyal States on the one hand, and the people of the 
Confederate States on the other, thus became enemies to each other . . .. "). 
28. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. 404, 406 (1864) ("[A]ll the people of each State 
or district in insurrection against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until by 
the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and 
permanently changed."). 
29. Coleman, 97 U.S. at 517 (noting that the residents of the occupied territory were 
subject to local laws); Dow, 100 U.S. at 165-66, 170 (immunity applied to the laws of an 
officially occupied country as they would to civil laws of any other country). 
30. Coleman, 97 U.S. at 517-18; Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1878) (noting 
that the Confederate government's actions were considered void and "simply the military 
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United States"). 
31. Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 207-08 (2001); G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 66 (1961); G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121 (1970). 
32. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 
17-18 (2006). 
33. See Melissa Patterson, Who 's Got the Title? Or, The Remnants of Debellatio in 
Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 469 (2006); David Scheffer, Beyond 
Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT' L L. 842, 843 (2003). 
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military. 34 Rules for belligerent occupation preclude an occupier from 
exerc1smg sovereignty over the territory, adopting expansive legal 
change, abusing the population, 35 and contravening laws of occupation 
and inflicting damage on local inhabitants without providing 
recompense. 36 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes a trusteeship on the 
occupier 37 that requires "preserv[ing] the status quo" and forbids 
transforming the occupied territory, 38 but does permit the occupier to 
establish a "system of administration" to preserve the status quo39 and to 
protect the local population. 40 Article 43 states that once the occupying 
34. Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, art. 42 para. 1, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3306, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 295 ("territory is considered occupied 
when it is ... placed under the authority of the hostile army."); Macleod v. United States, 229 
U.S. 416, 425 (1913) (stating that a military occupation occurs when there is an "invasion 
plus possession of the enemy's country for the purpose of holding it temporarily at least."); 
U.S. DEP'T ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 355 (July 18, 
1956), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military _ Law/pdf/law _ warfare-1956.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2015) ( defining an official occupation "as a result of which the invader has 
rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority and ... 
successfully substituted its own authority" over an area that it intends to hold). 
35. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 129-30 
(2010). 
36. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (providing that an 
occupying power that violates the Hague Regulations shall "be responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces ."); see also Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]("A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It 
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."). 
37. Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role 
of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Framework 
ofRightsandDutiesofOccupyingPowers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L&COMP. L. REV. 85, 101-02 
(2009) ( expressing that the occupant administers a territory for the local people and in this 
status is a trustee). 
38. See generally Scheffer, supra note 33, at 851; Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the 
Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi "Freedom," 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 
2309-10 (2007); Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the 
Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & 
POL'Y 23, 27 (2004). 
39. Breven C. Parsons, Moving the Law of Occupation into the Twenty-First Century, 
57 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2009). 
40. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal 
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 24 (2004) (stating that pursuant to the 
1907 Hague Regulations, the military is required to change from destroying as combatants 
to preserving as the occupant). The Geneva Protocol I of 1977, which was ratified by over 
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military obtains control and power over the territory, the occupier, 
"shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country" existing at the time of the 
invasion.41 The occupier's duties to preserve existing institutions and 
protect the civilian population are instrumental to facilitating self-
determination because these conditions permit local people to exercise 
free choice.42 
Despite provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and subsequent 
international law conventions, there has been some discrepant precedent 
of occupiers imposing reform on an occupied population during this 
century.43 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the U.S. military authority 
to construct government institutions in Puerto Rico in 1909 after the 
former government was displaced44 and in the Philippines in 1913.45 
Occupier dictates were typical under the World War I colonial-power 
170 countries but not by the US or Iraq (until 20 l 0), sought to add greater protections to 
civilians in occupied territories. See International Humanitarian Law Treaties & 
Documents, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign 
?ReadForm&id=4 70&ps=P (last visited Apr. I, 2015) (highlighting a full list of 
signatories); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 51 ("The civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military 
operations."). 
41. Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 43 (emphasis added); WolffHeintschel von 
Heinegg, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Factors in War to Peace 
Transitions, 27 HARV. J.L. & Pub. PoL'Y 843, 862 (2004) ("[An occupier] is not entitled to 
enact comprehensive changes to the political, legislative, administrative, and social 
structures in the occupied territory."). 
42. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4-6 
(2004) (noting that the Hague and Geneva Conventions restrict the occupying power and 
therein grants rights to the occupied population). 
43. See Minxin Pei & Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record on 
Nation Building, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE PoL'Y BRIEF 2 (2003), available 
at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybriet24.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
( considering sixteen cases of US military "nation-building" over the past one hundred years 
and only two (Germany and Japan) were identified as clear successes); David Wippman, 
Sharing Power in Iraq, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 29, 30 (2004). 
44. Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909) ("By the ratifications of the treaty 
of peace [of 1898 with Spain 1, Porto Rico fsicl ceased to be subject to fthat countryl and 
became subject to the legislative power of Congress .... The authority to govern such 
ceded territory is found in the laws applicable to conquest and cession .... [U]nder the 
military control of the President as Commander in Chief."). 
45. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425 (1913) ("The local government [of a 
conquered country l being destroyed, the conqueror may set up its own authority, and make 
rules and regulations for the conduct of temporary government, and to that end may collect 
taxes and duties to support the military authority and carry on operations incident to the 
occupation."). 
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controlled League of Nation mandates. 46 Likewise, following World 
War II and from 1943 to 1945, the Allied powers unilaterally 
established deep occupational control and introduced new government 
institutions on Germany 47 and engaged in fairly transformative 
occupations of Germany and Japan.48 
The historical right to subjugate a population ( due to the ability to 
subdue) following conquest is no longer valid and occupier dictates are 
not sanctioned, but exceptional and distant cases can be distinguished 
from institutional alterations implemented for the objective of 
actualizing standards encountered in human rights agreements. 49 Even 
if an occupier imposed reform in a contemporary occupation process 
that could be procedurally akin to the historical practice of 
unilateralism, the substantive result would presumably differ if the goal 
is to alter abusive institutions and legal structures and to preserve a 
civilized status quo. The target state is not entitled to retain oppressive 
institutions pursuant to universal human rights standards. However, in 
most cases, the substance of legal institutions may not be faulty, but 
instead structures are abusive on application for lack of government 
adherence or enforcement, which had been the case for eight years with 
46. Brian Deiwert, A New Trusteeship for World Peace and Security: Can an Old 
League of Nations Idea Be Applied to a Twenty-First Century Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 771, 777-79, 782-84 (2004). 
47. Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing that the U.S. 
military possessed "supreme authority," controlled "local government institutions and 
courts," and holding that "(t]he U.S. military, entering Berlin as conquerors, were immune 
from jurisdiction of the courts of the conquered country, or would have been if any such 
courts had remained"); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361-62 (1952) (noting that the US 
did apply certain aspects of the German Criminal Code to non-Germans in the occupied 
territory). 
48. JAMES GALLEN, Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework, in Jus POST 
BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 58, 62 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014); see generally RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. 
ROBrNSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER 
MACARTHUR (2002); CHARLES HARRIS, ALLIED MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF ITALY, 1943-
1945 (1957); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY (1947). 
49. RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev'd ed. 1999) ("when states violate minimum standards by 
committing, permitting, or threatening intolerable acts against their own people or other 
nations, then some of the privileges of sovereignty are forfeited."); Robert Bejesky, Pruning 
Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. 
REV. 821, 829-31 (2012) ( discussing that mandatory human rights standards are provided in 
a number of human rights agreements); Mark W. Janis, Human Rights and Imposed 
Constitutions, 37 CONN. L. Rev. 955, 957 (2005) (stating that there was even a form of 
human rights transplant constitutionalism that was "prodded on" Eastern Europe after the 
demise of the Soviet Union). 
10
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Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. 50 
In addition to ensuring that institutions meet global human rights 
standards so that self-determination can be soundly exercised by a free 
people, 51 self-determination can also be reasonably interpreted to 
require a political system that permits citizens to democratically choose 
their govemment52 or at least to ensure that there is a widely-shared and 
legitimate connection between the populace and government. 53 
50. Michael M. Farhang, Reconstructing Justice: The Coalition Provisional Authority 
Took Giant Steps to Guarantee Iraq a Functioning Criminal Justice System, 27 L.A. LAW. 
44, 46 (2004) (noting that previous Iraqi criminal law institutions had flaws that should be 
supplemented). For example, pre-invasion Iraqi law prohibited torture and coercive 
confessions, but the former regime often ignored provisions. Law on Criminal Proceedings 
with Amendments, No. 23 of 1971, Decree No. 230, at para. 27 (Iraq), available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061208171014/http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/docume 
nts/Iraqi_Criminal_procedure_Code.pdf (last visited Apr. I, 2015); see supra Introduction 
(noting Maliki's rule). 
51. Failure to maintain human rights may undermine the states right to self-
determination because of the adverse relation between the populace and government, while 
sustaining human rights can promote the theory of state sovereignty derived from a free 
people. See e.g. STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 4 (1999) 
( emphasizing that principles of sovereignty should not only include the traditional definition 
of Westphalian sovereignty with respect to foreign relations, but must also include 
"domestic sovereignty," which requires the government to also rule in the interests of the 
people); GEORGE P . FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 
58 (1993) ("In a world of dual and conflicting loyalties, the state's demand for exclusive 
loyalty is rapidly losing its grip."); Nehal Bhuta, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of 
a Jus Post Bel/um of Constitutional Transformation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 799, 807 (2010) 
(noting the theory of emphasizing the sovereignty in the people, which was inherent in the 
popular sovereign struggles between the Crown and Parliament in England during the 
seventeenth century and during the French Revolution of 1789). 
52. Self-determination and sovereignty can be interpreted in different ways. Bhuta, 
supra note 51, at 810-11 (stating that the United Nations was formed not on representative 
governments within states, but on self-determination, rejection of foreign rule and 
domination, non-intervention, equality of states, and political legitimation). Self-
determination permits a people with a common connection to a given territory to have the 
right to govern their own affairs, which was a critical principle during the era of 
decolonization. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 31, para. 2. Self-determination 
could support a sub-national secession, based on popular will, if there is a licit justification. 
See In re Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] 2 S.C. R. 217, para. 134 (Can.) (holding that there is a 
right to secede when the people are disrespected or deprived of rights of the larger state); 
Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & 
POL'Y 373, 379 (2003); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW : NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 134 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing Quebec's 
49% vote to secede from Canada in 1995). 
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. Doc A/810 at 
21 (1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."); see 
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that all citizens have the right to participate in 
public affairs, to be elected, to choose representatives, and to vote). Harvard Political 
Science Professor Arthur Isak Applbaum remarks of a generally agreed-upon definition of 
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Whether voting and democratic institutions are mandated to sanction the 
public choice accord between the government and populace have been 
controversial and may not be required by customary international law. 54 
After all, the principle of sovereign rights grounds the U .N. system and 
affirms that "[ e ]ach state has the right to freely choose and develop its 
political, social, economic and cultural systems. "55 On the other hand, 
since the end of the Cold War, there has been a progressing acceptance 
of the assumption that a democratic government is more palatable than 
an undemocratic govemment56 and this preference is accordant with the 
theoretical view of international law that presumes sovereignty resides 
with the people and not the government. 57 Moreover, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which entered into 
political legitimacy: "[T]he test of legitimate government is two-pronged. There needs to be 
an adequate connection between the governors and the governed, and there needs to be 
adequate protection of at least basic human rights." Arthur Isak Applbaum, Forcing a 
People to be Free, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 359, 288 (Fall 2007). Experts also maintain that 
legal institutions must be a representation of "widely shared societal commitment" and 
public will. See Daniel Bodansky, Establishing the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 
119, 131 (2004); Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bel/um 
and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 McGILL L.J. 285, 323 (2005). 
54. See Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law, 
34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 33, 56-59, 81 (2008) (stating that it does not appear that there is a 
customary international law right to democratic governance); Joseph S. Nye, Public 
Diplomacy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS 94, 98 (2008) (noting that fewer than half of the 
countries in the world are democracies). 
55. GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 31. 
56. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, para. 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.157/23 (July 12, 
l 993)("Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed 
will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems 
and their full participation in all aspects of their lives"); U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda 
for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, para. 82, U.N. Doc. 
A/477 /277 (June 17, 1992) ("Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era 
of prosperity and justice."); Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The 
Challenge at Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, at 143, 143-47 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001); Petersen, supra 
note 54, at 57 n.132 (since 1988, the UN General Assembly has issued over a dozen 
resolutions on "Enhancing the Effectiveness" of elections without explicitly affirming a 
"right to democratic elections"); Ronald Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law, 
12 J. DEMOCRACY 20, 25 (2001); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in 
International Law, 17 YALE J. INT' L L. 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right 
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). 
57. See c. MICHAEL BARRY, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FOURTH FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 35 (2011) (noting that the U.S. Constitution's Framers viewed that "People 
are Sovereign," meaning that sovereignty resided in the people); BENVENISTI, supra note 42, 
at 94-96; W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (Gregory 
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 
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force in 197 6 and has been ratified by more than 160 countries, states in 
Article 1 that "[ a ]11 peoples have the right of self-determination," the 
right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development."58 Article 25 of the ICCPR 
explicitly endows a right to electorally select a government. 59 
Beyond reaching human rights standards, one can contest whether 
given occupier-fiduciary reforms are valid as necessary to properly 
administrate and preserve the status quo of a citizenry's way of life60 or 
whether newly imposed, modern legal norms should depose antiquated 
rules inconsistent with standards of civil society. 61 A convincing retort 
to a reformist position espousing a carte blanche is that there are no 
antiquated rules, other than those that fail to meet human rights 
standards or minister criterion of representative government, and an 
intervener that unilaterally issues fiats for reform is administrating 
immorally, improperly, and possibly illegally because every society has 
the self-determined prerogative to elect its own culturally-distinct 
institutions. 62 
A United Nations authorization could also constitute an institution 
to execute an occupier role or might leverage the actual or perceived 
58. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 1. 
59. Id. art. 25. 
60. Patterson, supra note 33, at 473. 
61. Michael J. Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central 
Criminal Court of Iraq, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2006) (Army JAG prosecutor expressing 
that "American advisors had to accomplish these and other tasks without offending the pride 
of the Iraqi lawyers and judges and without insulting their legal traditions, despite the fact 
that some of these traditions were barbaric and far outside the norm of modem 
jurisprudence."); Mirko Bagaric & John R. Morss, Transforming Humanitarian Intervention 
from an Expedient Accident to a Categorical Imperative, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 421, 439-40 
(2005) (stating that "whether other nations should forcibly defend only the basic right to 
life, or whether they should also be concerned with lesser rights, such as the right to own 
property" and other liberties are matters that should be contemplated). 
62. STROM SETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 22, at 310 ( emphasizing that simply 
imposing new legal rules without a focus on matching culture of the ordinary people is not 
likely to produce lasting reform); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE 
OF DISHARMONY 243 (1981) (noting that a foremost reason to oppose interventionism is that 
"it is morally wrong for the United States to attempt to shape the institutions of other 
societies. Those institutions should reflect the values and behavior of the people in those 
societies. To intrude from outside is imperialism or colonialism, which also violates 
American values."); Madeleine K. Albright, Speech: Remarks Based on New Book Memo to 
the President Elect: How We Can Restore America's Reputation and Leadership, 20 FLA. J. 
INT' L L. 1, 4 (2008) ("You cannot impose democracy. Imposing democracy is an 
oxymoron."); Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1, 2004, 12:00 PM), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/0 l /nation-building-
10 I /302862/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (maintaining that "outsiders can never build 
nations."). 
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authority of the state-military occupier. The U.N. can exercise 
significant governance authority over a territory under U.N. Charter 
Article 81, 63 particularly to the extent that the governance would foster 
other core U.N. objectives, such as to facilitate self-rule and terminate 
colonialism.64 In 1949, the U.N. General Assembly appointed a U.N. 
Commissioner for Libya, a former Italian colony;65 a Trusteeship 
Council over Palestine;66 and authorized Australia, New Zealand, and 
the U.K. to exercise full legislative, administrative and jurisdictional 
powers over the territory of Nauru67 and required the occupation to 
compensate for occupier-associated wrongs. 68 
If a U.N. body does not administrate, one concern over the United 
Nations validation is whether the state-occupier's domain derives from 
the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council 
should remain within its primary prerogative of addressing threats to 
international peace and security, 69 whereas the General Assembly has 
universal membership and possesses broader missions, 70 which not only 
imparts heightened accreditation with broad-based approval from across 
the world but also is more appropriate for authorizing civilian and 
inclusive government objectives during an occupation. Perhaps 
observing this logic of selecting the most appropriate UN institution, no 
Security Council resolutions or international agreements have ever 
sanctioned expansive occupations, which includes the operations that 
63. U.N. Charter art. 81 (recognizing that the UN can be a potential Administering 
Authority over territories); see generally Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timar: The 
Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (2001). 
64. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 73, 76 para. l(b); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that paramount UN goals included ending 
non-self-governing rule and assisting territories achieve self-government). 
65. G.A. Res. 289 (IV)A, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. N1089, at 10 (1949). 
66. G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. N516, at 132 (1947). 
67. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992 
I.CJ. 240, 240-70 (June 26). 
68. Id. at 240; see Deiwert, supra note 46, at 795 (stating that Nauruans were entitled 
to AUS $107 million in compensation because Australia mined out one-third of the island 
while under Australian administration). 
69. U.N. Charter art. 24(1). On the dangers of broadly-construed Security Council 
missions, see Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in THE 
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 361, 388 (Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (emphasizing that the Security Council's 
"open-textured and discretionary powers could be inherently subject to abuse, with profound 
consequences for the fundamental rights of States and individuals bearing the brunt of such 
measures"). 
70. U.N. Charter arts. 9-10 (noting universal membership and that the General 
Assembly can "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter 
or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter"). 
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were authorized for Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo; all of which only permitted temporary and 
specific military and civilian administration tasks. 71 
To summarize the trajectory of change, the following chart 
contextualizes these forms of occupation and includes their underlying 
justifications: 
Full Very Limited 
Prerogative Prerogative 
Historical Post-World Temporary United Nations Hague and 
notions of War II occupation authorizations Geneva 
colonialism occupation with dictates and actions to Conventions: 
following the uphold human No alteration 
US Civil War rights under 
occupation 
except to 
preserve and 
protect 
Justification: Justification: Justification: Justification: Justification: 
Rule of the Ending Maintain The UN Uphold self-
mighty belligerency peace inside possesses a determination 
and quelling an existing peace and and terminate 
anger when sovereign security remnants of 
cities and state mission and colonialism 
infrastructure endeavors to 
were uphold 
destroyed paramount 
principles of 
self-
determination 
and human 
rights 
71. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 852-53; STROMSETH, W!PPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 
22, at 6 (referencing similarities of post-conflict involvement in Kosovo, East Timor, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq); see e.g. S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 
1999) (stating the international civil presence in Kosovo is designed to "provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people can enjoy substantial autonomy within 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration 
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions."); S.C. Res. 1244, Annex 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (approving 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in conflict-ridden Kosovo in June 1999); 
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (creating the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in non-self-governing East Timor in October 1999). 
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To briefly prelude the next Part's discussion of the Bush White 
House's Coalition Provisional Authority by contextualizing this chart 
and its justifications, the occupier's colonial-like dictates have been 
universally rejected for most of the twentieth century and the 
justification for imposing reforms following World War II were 
conducted to address peace and security considerations of aggressors 
and the societal crisis of the Axis powers after defeat. Both Germany 
and Japan have been subjected to a seventy-plus year, and counting, 
occupation. By contrast, the Bush administration committed the 
aggression on Iraq without the assent of the Security Council 72 and the 
allegations of security threats from Iraq were patently false, 73 making 
similar justifications for the compelled reform encountered in the post-
World War II cases inappropriate. Moreover, none of these reasons for 
war had anything to do with overthrowing a government and remaining 
in a near-nine year occupation, 74 but the decisive post-invasion 
development was that the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 
and specified terms for the occupation. The following part discusses the 
Bush Administration's pre-resolution rhetoric, the terms of Resolution 
1483 's sanction, and the fact that the CPA effectively ignored 
occupation law and liberally interpreted the terms of Resolution 1483 to 
72. See generally Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary 
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 295 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections]; Bodanky, supra note 53, at 132 (stating that a 
significant percentage of the global populace and Iraqis viewed the military invasion as 
illegitimate, making byproducts of that invasion potentially coercive). 
73. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Intelligence Information"] 
(stating that intelligence assessments were specious and that the Bush administration pushed 
the allegations without reservation); see Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False 
Pretenses, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
(aggregating a summary of 935 false statements). 
74. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and 
the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 464 (2011) (emphasizing that 
Congress provided the Executive with a limited authorization to use force, conditioned on 
the existence of an actual imminent threat, which means that when the White House began 
offering additional rationalizations after the war, particularly of humanitarian intervention, 
"such talk was blatantly inconsistent with the plain language of the 2002 resolution."); 
Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 350-69. While overthrowing a government 
is not a direct legal justification for intervening, arguments have been made to support a 
connection between democracy (which might be the result of replacing an authoritarian 
regime) and peace with other states. See U.N. Doc. S/2001 /1154 (Dec. 5, 2001) (former 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stating that "democratic institutions and processes ... 
minimize the risk that differences or disputes will erupt into armed conflict ... In this way, 
a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace."). 
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do whatever it pleased. 
II. IRAQI DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
A. Bush Administration Rhetoric 
The Bush and Blair administrations often refrained from referring 
to the presence of the American and British militaries in Iraq as an 
"occupation,"75 but frequently preferred to use the phrase "liberation" 
and assured that Iraqi citizens would quickly control their own 
government. 76 The importance of conveying a general message of 
liberation to the Iraqi people was deliberated three months prior to the 
invasion in a Pentagon operation called "Rapid Reaction Media Team," 
which arranged for disassembling the current Iraqi media network and 
75. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at ix. 
76. President Rallies Troops at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, WHITE HOUSE 
(Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/03/20030326-4.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) ("We will help the Iraqi 
people to find the benefits and assume the duties of self-government. The form of those 
institutions will arise from Iraq's own culture and its own choices."); Interview on 
Doordarshan Television of India, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http:l/2001-
2009 .state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19075 .htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
(noting the aspiration of "put[ting] in place a new government that will reflect the will of all 
of the people"); Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with 60 Minutes II, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 
(Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. 
aspx?transcriptid=2239 (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (agreeing that it is critical to have "free 
institutions" that are a product of the culture and local people, stating that "we're going to 
try to be working with the Iraqis to help them build free institutions, and these are people 
who understand free institutions and, under Iraq, in a way that nobody who's not an Iraqi 
will ever understand," and noting that this free and functioning government will be 
developed "as rapidly as possible"); Joint Conference with Serbian Prime Minister 
Zivkovic, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 2, 2003), available at http:l/2001-
2009 .state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19296.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
(Powell stating: "I can assure you that we all want to end this as soon as possible so we can 
go on with the task of allowing the Iraqi people to form a new government- a government 
that is democratic, a government that will represent all the people of Iraq, a government that 
will cause Iraq to live in peace with its neighbors"); Deputy Defense Wolfowitz, General 
Pace on NBC's Meet the Press, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 6, 2003), available at 
http ://i ipdigital. usembassy. gov /st/ english/texttrans/2003/04/20030406 l 92943attocnich0. 18 9 
7852.html#axzz3C03RtEwz (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (Wolfowitz stating: "The goal is ... 
to move as rapidly as possible after the regime is gone to a government that genuinely 
represents the Iraqi people"); Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee: 
The Future of NATO and Iraq by Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. DEP'T DEF (Apr. 10, 2003), available 
at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=365 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015) (Wolfowitz stating: "One of the greatest responsibilities of the coalition will be to 
help Iraqis create a new government, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, of the Iraqi people, by 
the Iraqi people and for the Iraqi people"). 
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implanting the occupier's message for society. 77 Top Bush 
Administration officials also punctuated an unequivocal theme that 
promised the foreign military presence in Iraq would rapidly ordain 
self-government and ensure that Iraqi choices would design political 
institutions. 
For example, on March 26, 2003, one week after the war began, 
President Bush affirmed: "We will help the Iraqi people to find the 
benefits and assume the duties of self-government. The form of those 
institutions will arise from Iraq's own culture and its own choices."78 
On April 2, Secretary of State Powell promised: "I can assure you that 
we all want to end this as soon as possible so we can go on with the task 
of allowing the Iraqi people to form a new government-a government 
that is democratic, a government that will represent all the people of 
lraq."79 On April 4, National Security Advisor Rice remarked: "We 
will leave Iraq completely in the hands of Iraqis as quickly as possible. 
As the President has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as 
long as needed, but not one day longer."80 On April 6, Undersecretary 
of Defense W olfowitz stated: "We come as an army of liberation, and 
we want to see the Iraqis running their own affairs as soon as they 
can."81 On April 13, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized: "And 
77. White Paper: "Rapid Reaction Media Team" Concept, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (Jan. 
2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/ 
iraq_media_Ol.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (referencing that the plan called for 
implementing an Iraqi "Free Media" network by "informing the Iraqi public about 
USG/coalition intent and operation, to stabilize Iraq, ... and to provide Iraqis hope for their 
future" and deploying "hand-picked" media experts from the US and UK to control the Iraqi 
media outlets). The program would control the media with messages of De-Bathification, 
war crimes of Saddam's regime, US-sponsored versions of "history telling," justice and the 
rule of law, and themes of Western entertainment (e.g. Hollywood and sports). Id. The 
latter element follows the approach used by the British and US media nearly a century ago, 
which employed distractions to create a compliant population. GARTH S. JOWETT & 
VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 100, 103, 162 (2006). 
78. In the President's Words: The Rights and Aspirations of the Iraqi People, WHITE 
HOUSE (July 8, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
infocus/iraq/rightsandasp.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) ( citing President Bush's Remarks 
to Troops Macdi/1 Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, Mar. 26, 2003); see id. (providing fifty 
statements from assorted speeches and contending that the Bush administration endeavored 
to provide liberty, freedom, and swift self-government to the Iraqi people). 
79. Joint Press Conference with Colin Powell, Zoran Zivkovic, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 2, 
2003), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/04 
/20030402205204rennetl0. l 897852.html#axzz3C 1 W8b 1 Rz (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
80. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, WHITE HOUSE 
(Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/ 
2003/04/20030404184631 ennoccmk0.1897852.html#axzz3C 1 W8b 1 Rz (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015). 
81. Deputy Defense Wolfowitz, General Pace on NBC's Meet the Press, supra note 76; 
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the overall [governance] authority at the present time obviously is 
General Franks. And the task is to create an environment that is 
sufficiently permissive, that the Iraqi people can fashion a new 
govemment."82 On April 24, General Jay Gamer, the former director of 
the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(forerunner to the CPA),83 stated: "And nobody is going to run those 
ministries other than the Iraqis themselves. I think we need to be 
absolutely clear about that .... The new ruler of Iraq is going to be an 
Iraqi . . . I don't rule anything."84 On April 28, Bush stated: "As 
freedom takes hold in Iraq, the Iraqi people will choose their own 
leaders and their own government. America has no intention of 
imposing our form of government or our culture. Yet, we will ensure 
that all Iraqis have a voice in the new govemment."85 
The message relayed by the Bush Administration was one of 
liberation, expeditious self-government, and the conservation of Iraqi 
choices in constituting institutions and culture, which were themes of 
intention that would presumably be quite palatable to the international 
community. The Bush Administration also did not discuss unilaterally 
1mposmg legal reform ( as distinguished from institutions of 
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with 60 Minutes II, supra note 76 (Wolfowitz 
remarking that one of the most important goals was "an Iraq that stands on its own feet that 
governs itself in freedom ... We'd like to get to that goal as quickly as possible."); Prepared 
Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee: The Future of NATO and Iraq by Paul 
Wolfowitz, supra note 76 (providing the "goal to leave Iraq in the hands [of the Iraqi people] 
as soon as possible"). 
82. Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with NBC Meet the Press, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Apr. 
13, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=2383 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015 ( also noting that "over some period of months 
the Iraqis will have their government selected by Iraqi people."); Transcript: Gen. Tommy 
Franks on Fox News Sunday, Fox NEWS (Apr. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/ story/2003/04/ 13/transcript-gen-tommy-franks-on-fox-news-
sunday/ (last visited Apr. l, 2015) (Franks remarking that Iraq would have a government 
that will provide the people with "freedom" and "liberty" and noting that "I think what we 
will see in the month and years ahead in Iraq will provide a bit of a model for how that can 
be done"). 
83. Gamer and the ORHA were replaced by Paul Bremer and the CPA in mid-May 
2003. While the reason for this replacement is not clear, perhaps the outcome supplanted 
the perception of a strictly US-creation that the Pentagon controlled- the ORHA- and an 
unavailing occupation, with a new entity that had an international label and appeared to be 
governed by civilians (rather than the military). 
84. Kathleen T. Rhem, Iraqis Need Work, Paychecks, U.S. Administrator Says, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Apr. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29065 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
85. President Discusses the Future of Iraq, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 28, 2003), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030428-3.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
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government) on the country. The correlative exigencies at the time 
these pledges were declared were that the former regime was displaced, 
infrastructure was destroyed by Pentagon bombing, societal affairs were 
halted, and humanitarian suffering was widespread, and the onset of 
these post-invasion reverberations led the U.N. Security Council to 
adopt Resolution 1472, one week after the invasion, to summon the 
international community to assist in resolving the humanitarian crisis. 86 
In fact, President Bush anticipated that such adverse conditions would 
befall because he adopted National Security Presidential Directive 24 
two months before the invasion in order to constitute an administrative 
unit called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
("ORHA")87 in order to execute administrative obligations of an 
occupation, control funding for humanitarian operations and 
reconstruction, and collaborate with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development ("USAID") to implement the operations. 88 Despite the 
dearth of foreign support for the invasion and the fact that ORHA was 
86. S.C. Res. 1472, Mar. 28, 2003, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003); S.C. RES. 1483, 
para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Problems perdured. S.C. RES. 1511, para. 
8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); (stating that additional humanitarian relief, 
economic reconstruction, conditions for sustainable development, and restoration of 
government institutions were necessary). Al Jazeera and a dozen other channels "provided 
straight news that in many ways gave their viewers a more rounded picture- from the 
inside- than the Anglo-American networks did. While the Anglo-American networks 
tended to show Allied medics treating injured Iraqi civilians tenderly while their armed 
colleagues handed out drinking-water cans to thirsty Iraqi POWs, the Arab media, while 
airing the briefings and sound bites coming from London, Washington, and Doha ... also 
showed the ... charred Iraqi bodies, [ corpses, blood-soaked pavements, blown-out brains, 
screaming infants and wailing women] ... grievously wounded civilians, ... [children 
wounded by US cluster bombs,] dead Allied troops and injured Iraqi soldiers, hospitals 
choked with wounded and burnt Iraqis. Away from the battle zone, the Arab networks 
showed Iraqi suffering, humiliation, and panic - distraught families held up at Anglo-
American military checkpoints, hooded Iraqi POWs, thousands of fleeing the capital, and 
civilians, deprived of food and water, driven to begging or looting." DILIP HIRO, SECRETS 
AND LIES: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND AFTER 192-94 (2004). 
87. Judith Miller, White House Assembles Officials to Review Plan to Rebuild Iraq 
After War, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23 
/world/threats-responses-looking-ahead-white-house-assembles-officials-review-plan.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that Directive 24 was adopted on January 20, 2003). 
88. L. Elaine Halchin, The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, 
Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 (June 6, 2005), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32370.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015); see Karen DeYoung & Dan Morgan, US. Plan for Iraq 's Future is Challenged; 
Pentagon Control, Secrecy Questioned, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at A2 l ( questioning the 
secrecy of the ORHA mission and intentions). ORHA would direct the post-invasion 
activities of "civilian aid, reconstruction, and civil administration or governance." Miller, 
supra note 87 ("The Bush administration's new office of postwar planning held a secret 
session this weekend to assess the government's plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if 
Saddam Hussein is overthrown, senior administration officials said today."). 
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not internationally-authorized,89 the Pentagon-run ORHA postulated 
that non-Coalition countries should deploy soldiers to stabilize Iraq90 
and that the U.N. should pay for the occupation. 91 
Jay Garner, a retired general, was the appointed head of the 
ORHA. 92 After irate Iraqis voiced widely-publicized complaints that 
nothing was getting accomplished, services were not being provided, 
and government officials had not been compensated for several weeks, 
Garner remarked that "[a]s soon as (the Iraqis) can identify those people 
to us, we'll start paying their salaries."93 The problem is that no one 
could identify salary recipients because the invasion overthrew the 
previous government and eventually CPA Order Number 1, which was 
adopted before the Security Council Resolution 1483 authorized an 
occupation, legally stripped between fifteen and thirty thousand public-
sector employees out of government due to association with the 
previous regime.94 Perhaps the sensibility of such a request was more 
persuasive at the time because the international community was still 
under the impression that, due to six months of false statement by the 
Bush administration, it was necessary to search for the prohibited 
weapons that Iraq supposedly possessed, but those weapons ultimately 
did not exist. 95 
89. The entity was created concomitant with UN inspections taking place, before Colin 
Powell addressed the Security Council, and before the UN Security Council had even begun 
the most intensive debates. Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 335-52. 
90. Michael R. Gordon, The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War, N.Y. 
TIM ES (Oct. 19, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/intemational 
/19war.html?pagewanted= l&_r=O (last visited Apr. I , 2015). 
91. Simon Chesterman, Bush, the United Nations and Nation-Building, 46 SURVIVAL 
101, 106 (2004). 
92. Miller, supra note 87 (stating that the plan was announced nearly a month before 
the invasion). After the American media had entirely accepted the justifications for the 
invasion as proven for several months, it hosted former military commanders explaining 
potential invasion plans. Ideas of an anticipated invasion were being planted at the same 
time Bush administration officials explained that no such action was inevitable. Robert 
Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 29, 83-84 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, 
Politico] . 
93. Rhem, supra note 84. 
94. Purge of Saddam loyalists, BBC (May 16, 2003 , 11 :55 AM), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/3033919 .stm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Adam 
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human 
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 614 (2006) (calling CPA Order No. 1 a much criticized 
order). 
95. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. , U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see generally 
Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72; Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 
73 , at 875-82; Lewis & Reading-Smith, supra note 73 (providing a chronological chart of 
false statements and noting that "President George W. Bush and seven of his 
administration's top officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security 
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B. U.N. Authority for Occupation 
In furtherance of Resolution 14 72 and to alleviate the continuing 
humanitarian crisis,96 the Security Council passed Resolution 1483, 
which commissioned the occupying "Authority" to preserve public 
order, deliver humanitarian aid, search for weapons of mass destruction 
(the Bush administration's purported reason for invasion), administrate 
government functions, and assist Iraqi citizens in forming new 
institutions of government. 97 Other than searching for prohibited 
weapons, which did not exist,98 the Resolution was constituted entirely 
to ameliorate injurious repercussions of an invasion and war that the 
United Nations had not authorized. Moreover, the pre-war diplomacy 
within the United Nations only involved questions of whether Iraq was 
violating a ban on enumerated prohibited weapons, but given that there 
were no proscribed weapons, even the underlying reason for invasion 
for which the Bush Administration was so insistent on convincing the 
Security Council and the international community--dire urgency from 
dreadful security peril99-made the invasion unnecessary and premised 
on "false pretences."100 It also appears that the Bush and Blair 
Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false 
statements in the two years following September 11, 2001, about the national security threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq .... On at least 532 separate occasions (in speeches, 
briefings, interviews, testimony, and the like), Bush and these three key officials, along 
with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and White 
House press secretaries Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, stated unequivocally that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction ( or was trying to produce or obtain them), links to Al 
Qaeda, or both."). 
96. S.C. Res. 1472, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (Mar. 28, 2003). 
97. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 2, 4, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); 
Permanents Reps. of the U.K. & U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated May 8, 2003 from the 
Permanent Reps. of the United Kingdom and the United States to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003), 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0608 
usukletter.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (recognizing that these itemizations were the 
goals). One cited example of significant concern was that "[m]ember States shall take 
appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return" of archeological items from the Iraq National 
Museum but the resolution does to mention that the Hague Regulations of 1907 (Arts. 43 
and 56) can require the US to pay for items destroyed or missing is there was a failure to 
secure. S.C. Res. 1483, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Hague Convention, 
supra note 36, arts. 43, 55, 56. 
98. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 73, at 875-82. 
99. Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 369-75. 
100. Press Release, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Senate Intelligence 
Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence (June 5, 2008), 
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015) (stating that the Bush Administration led the nation to war under "false pretenses"); 
see also Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 74, at 464. 
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administrations may have enthusiastically sponsored a Security Council 
resolution for occupation to introduce a perception of the Security 
Council implicitly authorizing the war post facto, 101 but this is not 
particularly convincing. 
Resolution 1483 specified the mission and conditions for 
occupation, but it was the CPA's unsparingly-construed assumptions of 
prerogative to unilaterally restructure government and, more 
controversially, adopt new laws that remained in contention. Curiously, 
in a later released memo, dated March 26, 2003, which was before 
Resolution 1483 was adopted, British Attorney General Goldsmith 
affirmed that "a further Security Council resolution is needed to 
authorise imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its 
Government" because without "a further resolution, the U.K. (and the 
U.S.) would be bound by the provisions of international law governing 
belligerent occupation, notably the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
1907 Hague Regulations." 102 Both the U.S. and U.K. acknowledged 
that they were bound by the Geneva and Hague conventions when 
Resolution 1483 was adopted 103 and delivered letters to the United 
Nations that stated "[t]he States participating in the Coalition will 
strictly abide by their obligations under international law," 104 and 
Resolution 1483 stated nothing about granting the occupation a 
prerogative to unilaterally impose reform. No unrestricted sanction was 
101. See Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Intervention as Legitimate Use of Force, 16 
MrNN. J. INT'L L. 407, 439 (2007) (contending that Resolution 1483 reflected "the UN's 
indirect, albeit unwilling, endorsement of the US intervention policies"); see contra Davis 
Brown, Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla Revisited: Good and Bad Faith, and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) ("Although the Security 
Council did not authorize the invasion, and several of its members opposed to it, the Council 
has nevertheless put its imprimatur of legitimacy on the presence of coalition forces in 
Iraq."). 
102. Roberts, supra note 94, at 609 (referencing that Goldsmith further added that the 
"imposition of major structural economic reforms would not be authorized by international 
law"). 
103. Stefan Talmon, A Plurality of Responsible Actors: International Responsibility 
for Acts of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 25/2007, 2007), available at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/-sann2029/SSRN-id 1018172%581 %5D.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
( citing 405. P ARL. DEB. H.C. ( 6th ser.) (2003) 22 available at 
http://www. publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo0305 l 2/debtext/30512-
05 .htm#305 l 2-05 _ spmin 1) (British Foreign Secretary remarking to the House of Commons: 
"The United Kingdom and the United States fully accept our responsibilities under the 
fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations."). 
104. Letter dated May 8, 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and and the United States of America to the 
President of the U.N. Security Council, S.C. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003). 
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endowed; Resolution 1483 expressly affirmed that the Geneva 
Conventions and the Hague Regulations restrictions applied, which 
limited the occupation, and merely rearticulated mandatory customary 
international law norms 105 and overtly stated that Iraqis had the power 
to select their own institutions. 106 The sequence of events with the 
invasion and occupation is a prime example of being granted a U .N. 
authority based on public promises about intentions, and being afforded 
an inch by the terms of the sanction and then taking a mile. 
Not only was the Security Council's institutional authority for this 
unprecedented circumstance placed into question by some Council 
members and the CPA' s exercise of authority inconsistent with the 
authority that it was actually granted, 107 but several Council members 
objected to Resolution 1483 because Britain and the US were unwilling 
to expressly grant the U.N. a genuine role and because members were 
concerned that Iraqis would be situated in a rather uncompromising and 
105. See Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC available at 
https://www.icrc.org/IHL#view:_idl :_id2:_id250:repeatl :5:labelAnchor (last visited Jan. 
25, 2015) (listing over 190 country-signatories to the Geneva Conventions); FRANCOISE 
BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 115 (Laura Brav & 
Clementine Olivier eds., 2d ed. 2007) (noting the customary international law status); see 
also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
161-168 (7th ed. 1997); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
33-36 (2d ed. 2000); S.C. Res. 1483, at pmble. para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 
2003) ( citing the applicability of the Hague and Geneva Conventions); see generally Boon, 
supra note 53, at 285 (noting that the United Nations promotes the obligation of occupiers to 
adhere to the Hague rules of occupation). 
106. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 
22, 2003) (Provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions affirm that foreign assistance 
is permitted to the extent that the occupied population is allowed to choose its own 
institutions and preserve its own culture and Resolution 1483 precisely affirmed this 
structure.); see e.g. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. para. 4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1483 (May 22, 2003) 
(requiring the US and UK to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective 
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of 
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people 
can freely determine their own political future"). 
107. U.N. Charter art. 2(1 )(7) (affirming the sovereign equality of members and states 
and that the UN shall not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state"); S.C. Res. 1483, at preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 
2003) (affirming the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq"; Mahmoud Hmoud, The 
Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution /483, 36 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 435, 438, 443, 445 (2004) (stating that "the legality of the Coalition's occupation 
of Iraq was, at best, questionable ... [T]he occupation of Iraq was an illegal act that should 
be recognized by the international community"); Felicity Barringer, U.N. Reaction to 
Resolution Seems Positive but Reserved, N.Y. TIMES, (May 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/l 0/world/aftereffects-diplomacy-un-reaction-to-
resolution-seems-positive-but-reserved.html?pagewanted=print (last visited Apr. I, 2015) 
(stating that the degree ofauthorization under 1483 was criticized by some Security Council 
members as exceeding any authority that the Security Council can even grant). 
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overly-dependent situation as oil revenues would be controlled and 
distributed by the U.S. and Britain.108 Given the humanitarian crisis, 
dissenting Security Council members voiced that they had no other 
viable option, but to approve Resolution 1483.109 Despite objections 
from Security Council members, Resolution 1483 was passed pursuant 
to the assumption that the U.N. would provide a significant advisory 
role and that political authority would be transferred to an Iraqi 
government as quickly as possible, 110 but after the Resolution went into 
effect, the Bush Administration ensured that the U.N. played almost no 
role 111 and the CPA did whatever it desired while appointing loyalists to 
the occupation, calling the assemblies of chosen individuals local 
representative bodies, ignoring the terms of Resolution 1483, and 
dictating new laws and reforms without regard to the Iraqi people. 
C. CPA Dictates 
i. Balancing Prerogative and Restrictions 
Even if an occupation is perceived as lawful, the self-determination 
of the local population can be violated by the manner of occupation. 112 
An occupying foreign military cannot alter the structure of government 
108. Gary Younge & Ian Black, Blueprint Gives Coalition Control of Oil, GUARDIAN 
(May 10, 2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/10/iraq.oil (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2015); Hmoud, supra note 107, at 451 (reporting that several Security 
Council members wanted the United Nations to administer the country); Scheffer, supra 
note 33 , at 850 (stating that the White House rejected a significant UN role); Paul Blustein, 
G- 7 Agrees that Iraq Needs Help with Debt; Important Roles seen for IMF, World Bank, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that the Bush administration was "balking at mandates 
that would give the United Nations as big a part in running postwar Iraq as many European 
nations want"). 
109. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 467lst mtg., at 11 , U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 21, 
2003), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4761 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2015) ( referencing a statement made by the Pakistani representative to the 
Security Council prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483 that captures the surrounding 
circumstance: "Pakistan, like several other members of the Security Council, has agreed, 
due to the exigencies of the circumstances, to the delegation of certain powers by the 
Security Council to the occupying Powers, as represented by the Authority."). Out of 
expediency and the dire humanitarian need, the Security Council should be perceived as a 
credibility surrogate in this case. 
110. See Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 823, 825 (2003). 
111. See BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 357-63 (2004); Nehal Bhuta, The 
Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT' L. L. 721 , 736-3 7 (2005); Grant, 
supra note 110, at 853. 
112. Yael Rouen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 IsR. L. Rev. 201, 218 
(2008). 
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or institutions in the occupied country 113 and must ensure that the pre-
occupation law remains in force, 114 which means that dictated 
frameworks, exceeding an occupier's authority, can be viewed as null 
and void. 115 Instead of heeding the lawful parameters of occupation 
Law, the CPA failed to conform to licit administrative responsibilities 
as an "occupier,"116 freehandedly imposed controversial reforms from 
its inception, 117 and adopted at least thirty new laws relating to the 
economy over its fourteen month existence, 118 which were blatant 
transgressions that tore society apart. 119 Immediately prior to its 
disbandment, the CPA locked in the reforms for the future 120 under 
Order 100 as Transitional Administrative Law, which could only be 
modified with a supra-majority vote of a future legislature and with the 
consent of the cabinet. 121 The CPA also replaced "the name of new 
113. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 
124 (2009); see also Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian 
Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 713-14 (2007) 
(stating that in prosecuting a lawfully conceived humanitarian intervention, "the authority 
structure of the offending state should not be overthrown, nor should the domestic political 
process of that state be permanently altered."); Bhuta, supra note 51, at 824 ( noting that an 
occupier "cannot legislate to 'implement' the population's right to self-determination 
through the creation of a new order."). 
114. See Boon, supra note 53 , at 322 (further stating that the occupational authorities 
freely accepted the conditions of the international law of occupation). 
115. See Scheffer, supra note 33, at 842; see also Peter Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled 
Transition, 51 N.Y. Rev. BOOKS 70 (Sept. 23, 2004) (book review). 
116. See Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2297; see also Roberts, supra note 94, at 614; 
Boon, supra note 53, at 324-25. 
117. See J. Stephen Shi, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel 
Following the Transfer of Power to the Iraqi Interim Government, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. 
L. 245, 246 (2004). 
118. See Kristen E. Boon, "Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, 
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 544 
(2007). 
119. See Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2301 ( expressing that "blatant transgressions 
outside the laws of occupation exacerbated the post-war tensions, jeopardizing the security, 
economy, and administration of the state and safety of the people."). 
120. Id. at 2332. 
121. See Antonia Juhasz, Bush's Economic Invasion of Iraq, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2005), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/14/opinion/oe-juhaszl4 (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2015) ("Laws governing banking, investment, patents, copyrights, business 
ownership, taxes, the media and trade have all been changed according to U.S. goals, with 
little real participation from the Iraqi people. (The T AL can be changed, but only with a 
two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly, and with the approval of the prime 
minister, the president and both vice presidents.) The constitutional drafting committee has, 
in tum, left each of these laws in place"). Yet, at the time that the T AL proposals were 
launched, it was only intended to remain operative until nation-wide elections scheduled for 
January 31, 2005. See also Law of Administration for the State oflraq for the Transitional 
Period (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemment/TAL.html (last 
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Iraqi institutions and officials for those of the CPA" in order to "protect 
the [CPA] reforms into the future." 122 
At the same time the CPA unilaterally dictated reforms and 
operated above the law, 123 President Bush was publicly representing that 
the institutional metamorphoses were a byproduct of Iraqi free will and 
self-governance, which was the same theme that top Bush 
Administration officials repeatedly represented as their intention for 
occupation starting shortly after the invasion and prior to the adoption 
of Resolution 1483. 124 The text of Resolution 1483 did bestow an 
occupational authority, which was akin to the Bush Administration's 
pre-Resolution 1483 public promises and to the restrictive approach to 
occupation enumerated in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, 125 but 
the occupation repeatedly contravened occupation law. 126 Moreover, 
during the occupation, the Bush Administration relayed that there was 
no substantial plan for post-war operations, 127 but one year after the 
invasion, declassified documents divulged that the White House's 
visited Apr. 1, 2015). Then, in the same law, it states that the laws would "remain in force 
until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force oflaw." See id. 
art. 26(C). Theories that have permitted overruling foreign occupation dictates in the past 
have included asserting that the laws were not consistent with international law (i.e. the 
doctrine of postliminy) or the occupier exceeded its authority. See ERNEST H. 
FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATIONS 145-50 
( 1942); ROLAND ROBERTS FOULKE, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-90 ( 1920). 
122. Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2332. 
123. See Ryan J. Liebl, Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the 
American Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose 
Actions?, 28 HAM LINE L. Rev. 91, 131 (2005) ("Under the legal system established by the 
CPA in Iraq, the CPA was above the law"). 
124. President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003) 
(emphasizing that "[t]he primary goal of our coalition in Iraq is self-government for people 
of Iraq, reached by orderly democratic process."); see supra Part II (A): Bush 
Administration Rhetoric. 
125. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 
22, 2003). 
126. Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post 
Bel/um, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 57, 61 (2009) (noting that the core concept of 
conservationism in protecting existing institutions during occupation was compromised); 
Patterson, supra note 33, at 472 (emphasizing that inherent in the title "Operation Iraqi 
Freedom" is the implicit assumption that the Bush administration was "not planning to 
respect the laws of any regime that had ever existed in Iraq."). 
127. THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 109 
(2006) (quoting Lieutenant General Joseph Kellogg, who was involved in the invasion 
planning, stating that "[t]here was no real plan" for postwar operations); T. CHRISTIAN 
MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS, LOST LIVES, AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ 
(2006) (noting that occupation planning was amiss); see also Monroe E. Price, Symposium: 
Foreward: Iraq and the Making of State Media Policy, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 8-9 
(2007). 
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Future of Iraq Project, constituted in early-2002 and over a year before 
the invasion, selected White House, State Department, CIA, and 
Pentagon employees, and two hundred Iraqi exiles, and adopted thirteen 
volumes comprising 2,000 pages of plans for government restructuring 
and economic reform. 128 Not only did the CPA ostensibly follow this 
blueprint and appoint similarly-situated defectors who were involved in 
the Future of Iraq Project, but the early and detailed planning suggests 
that the Bush White House never had any intention of respecting 
occupation law. 
One of the most significant complications with the CPA' s 
unilateralism is that hostilities across the population can be expected to 
erupt if new institutions shift resources and alter political, social, and 
economic power. 129 Reform, particularly capitalist and privatization 
frameworks, can generate winners, but also antagonistic losers because 
a democratically-elected government or even representative locals did 
128. Farrah Hassan, New State Department Releases on the 'Future of Iraq ' Project, 
NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Eric Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, 
State Dept. Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/l 0/19/world/struggle-for-iraq-planning-state-dept-study-
foresaw-trouble-now-plaguing-iraq.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (stating that the 13 
volumes and over 2,000 pages of the Future of Iraq Project was not released until "several 
House and Senate committees" had requested them); US DEP'T ST., THE FUTURE OF IRAQ 
PROJECT: OIL AND ENERGY WORKfNG GROUP 2 (Apr. 30, 2003) (declassified in part on June 
22, 2005), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 198/ 
FOI%200il.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (espousing "decentralization" which literally 
means reducing central government control, but is apt to also result in privatization or at 
least significant advocacy for private sector participation). This fetish for privatization is 
particularly controversial when exploiting the natural resources of a territory is expressly 
prohibited under occupation law. Patterson, supra note 33, at 478 ; Antonio Perez, 
Symposium: Markets in Transitions: Reconstruction and Development: Part One -
Reconstruction: Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia and Performance for China: 
Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in Iraq - Occupation Under the Law of War vs. 
Global Governance Under the Law of Peace, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. 53, 55, 63 (2004). 
129. See Judith Kullberg and William Zimmerman, Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, 
and Problems of Russian Democracy, 51 WORLD POL. 323, 324 (1999) (writing of polls 
several years into the Russian reforms and noting that elites like the system because 
"[s]upport for liberalism is causally related to the ability of individuals to participate in the 
new economic order: those who are 'locked out' of the new economy and are constrained by 
circumstances and context from improving their conditions will be more likely to express 
antiliberal values and attitudes," but only a small segment of the Russian population 
dramatically benefited with the fall of the socialist economy, but a majority of the Russian 
population has been harmed); Duncan Kennedy, Shock and Awe Meets Market Shock, 
BOSTON Rev. (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/world/duncan-
kennedy-shock-and-awe-meets-market-shock (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (listing the 
capitalist reforms applied to Iraq and noting that "[ e ]conomic development is a dynamic 
process in which small initial disadvantages often translate into massive permanent 
inequalities"). 
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not enact the laws. Reactions may arouse immediate violence or beget 
delayed hostilities because of the belief that the occupation coerced 
unfair conditions and subsequently enforced those ultimatums with a 
police power. In fact, the existence of this police power to protect 
economic reforms into the future is found in both the secret agreement 
on the continuing occupation consummated by the Bush and Maliki 
governments in 2007 and the withdrawal agreement adopted in 2008. 130 
Having addressed how CPA dictates were inconsistent with 
occupation law and the mandate contained in Resolution 1483, the CPA 
was entirely reasonable to presume that it possessed significant latitude 
to ensure that Iraqi law comported with customary international law or 
jus cogen doctrines in the case of universal human rights standards, 
such as principles contained in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 131 which 
was an implication drawn in the typology depicted in Part II. Although, 
it is difficult to reconcile the occupation's right to impose compliance 
with human rights standards in the cases of the Pentagon's high-profile 
mass incarcerations and interrogation abuses at Abu Ghraib prison 132 
130. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the 
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities 
during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, art. 27, Nov. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ l 22074.pdf (last visited Apr. l, 2015) (stating 
that the U.S. military would agree to protect Iraq's constitutional order in the future); White 
House, Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and 
Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, Nov. 26, 2007, 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007 I 11 /20071126-
11.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (stating that the U.S. would further support Iraq's 
financial and economic system and "facilitate[] and encourage[] the flow of foreign 
investments into Iraq"). 
131. Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition , 45 
VA. J. INT'L L. 451, 463 (2005-06). These alterations would include having an effective 
judiciary, having institutions that would prohibit any future Iraqi government from having 
the prerogative or means of perpetrating torture and discrimination, and promoting due 
process standards in criminal law, which were actions that the CPA did take. Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Order No. 7, Penal Code, §§ 3(2), 4, CPNORD/9 June 2003/07 
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ 
20030610_CPAORD_7_penal_Code.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (banning torture and 
prohibiting law enforcement officers and legal system personnel from discriminating); 
Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 13, The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, § 6, 
CP NORDIX 2004/13 (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ 
regulations/20040422 _ CP AORD _ 13 _Revised_ Amended.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
( establishing the court system and specifying that judges must be independent); Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Order 15, Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee, 
CPNORDI-- June 2003, June 23, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ 
regulations/20030623 _ CP AORD _ 15 _ Establishment_ of_ the _Judicial_ Reveiw _ Committee.p 
df (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
132. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
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and with the brutality and human rights abuses of Prime Minister 
Maliki, 133 the long-term prime minister that the Bush administration 
effectively installed. 
The design of democratic institutions was also a legitimate CPA 
reform that was very acceptable across Iraqi society134 and engendered 
widespread support from the international community, but the manner 
in which reforms were executed and the institutional preferences that 
were codified proved controversial. 135 There is complexity for any 
transitional political system due to discord over what "democracy" 
means because of the many different models across the world, 136 but 
or Punishment art. 14(1), opened/or signature Dec. 10. 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 ("Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture 
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the 
means for as full rehabilitation as possible."); Frank, supra note 61, at 3 n.5 (mentioning the 
torture scandal and noting that it arose prior to the "liberation oflraq."). The abuses at Abu 
Ghraib and the interrogations ordered by the Bush administration were not consistent with 
norms of modem humanitarian jurisprudence. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu 
Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice, 32 BUFF. Pus. INT. L.J. 103 (2013). 
133. See Dirk Adriaensens, Iraq: Unspoken Crimes Against Humanity Committed 
Against the People of Iraq , CENTRE FOR RES. ON GLOBALIZATION (Jan. 28, 2012), available 
at http://www.globalresearch.ca/iraq-unspoken-crimes-against-humanity-committed-
against-the-people-of-iraq/29162 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (itemizing warnings about 
Maliki's abuses); Letter to President Obama Regarding the Visit of Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/ 10/29/letter-president-obama-regarding-visit-iraqi-prime-
minister-nuri-al-maliki (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting 5,740 deaths in areas such as 
Basra, Thi Qar and Baghdad, and within Diyala and Ninewa and that perpetrators are not 
being held accountable, and stating that this impunity has infuriated Sunnis who "see the 
government' s failure to hold Shia-dominated security forces accountable as confirmation 
that policies remain rooted in sectarianism"); Maginnis, supra note 11 (member of the UK 
House of Lords writing that "Maliki has created a Mafia-like network of criminals and 
assassins to eliminate the voice of opposition at every level" and estimated that a thousand 
Sunnis have been killed every month for the past decade by these assassins); supra 
Introduction. 
134. Public International Law & Policy Group and the Century Foundation, 
Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic 
Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. Rev. 53, 56 (2004); Roberts, supra note 94, at 621 (stating 
that "of all the parts of a transformative project, the ones likely to have the strongest appeal 
include the introduction of an honest electoral system as part of a multiparty democracy .. . 
reflecting as it does the sense that democracy and self-determination ... constitute not only 
an important part of a human rights package, but also an acceptable means of hastening the 
end of an occupation."). 
135. Note, Democracy in Iraq: Representation Through Ratification, 199 HARV. L. 
Rev. 1201, 1201 (2006) [hereinafter Note]; Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law 
and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002) (noting the 
assumption that Iraq fell into the category of a country that suffered from a democratic 
deficit). 
136. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. NRES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000) (articulating the very 
basic institutional structures that can be agreed upon); JAN TEORELL, DETERMINANTS OF 
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perhaps the most precarious variable regarding democratization 
protrudes from the fact that even the American public overwhelmingly 
believes that American democracy has been subject to "corporate 
capture" 137 and that the CPA was intent on subordinating public 
functions as part of the democratic process, which may disempower 
citizens. 
ii. Constitutional Reforms 
An indication of the agitation over the broadness of reforms, how 
occupational dictates can bind society without commensurate local 
democratic will, and the dominance of U.S. influence on the Iraqi 
political system, is encountered in the Iraqi constitutional ratification 
process. In any country, a constitutional drafting process can be 
essential for establishing robust and abiding societal norms because the 
constitution endows and structures government powers, 138 imposes 
constraints on government, 139 formulates enduring rules, and requires all 
legislation and administrative regulations to comport with constitutional 
principles. Countries, such as the U.S., have traversed prolonged 
periods of "constitutional construction" in which constitutional 
ratification is followed the interpretation of abstract principles, vague 
clauses, and interacting precedent to set a trajectory of expectations 
DEMOCRATIZATION: EXPLAINING REGIME CHANGE IN THE WORLD, 1972-2006, at 30 (2010) 
(noting that beyond the "basic criteria" of having effective elections and political rights, 
"there is profound disagreement over the meaning of democracy"); CHARLES TILLY, 
DEMOCRACY 2-3 (2007) (listing a series of indicators for democracy, as derived from a 
Freedom House checklist); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in 
DESIGNfNG DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 253, 253-54 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 
2000) ("there is no agreement on the political and constitutional arrangements most likely to 
be conducive to peace and accommodation in a democratic context"); Nick Robinson, 
Citizens Not Subjects: US. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign 
Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647, 676-77 (2007) (stating that notions of suitability of 
democracy have evolved since Plato and Aristotle theorized about democracy over two 
thousand years ago and assumed that it was only suitable for city-states and an ideal 
electorate size of 5,040). 
137. Survey: January 18-27, 2008, WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (Jan. 18-27, 2008), 
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar08/USGov _ Mar08 _ quaire.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (finding that 94% of Americans believe that "leaders should pay 
attention to the views of the people as they make decisions" and that 80% of Americans 
believed that the US was "run by a few big interests" with only 19% believing that US 
government is "run for the benefit of the people"). 
138. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and 
Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 142 (2007). 
139. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature 
of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in 
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution"). 
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through rules and practices. 140 Whether there are stable and effective 
societal norms depends on whether there is a commitment to and 
acceptance of the values incorporated into constitutional provisions, 
institutions, and codes. 141 
In the case oflraq's constitutional drafting procedures, the process 
was conducted rapidly, under the shadow of a gun, 142 in secrecy, with a 
small committee of CPA and CPA-appointed Iraqi Governing Council 
("IGC") members, 143 and without Iraqi citizens discerning the bearing 
of provisions 144 or possessing an effective avenue for challenging the 
drafting process or the IGC. 145 Feldman and Martinez opined that the 
Iraqi public's rejection of the IGC and its lack of perceived democratic 
qualities significantly delayed the constitutional drafting process. 146 
140. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers 
and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. Rev. 1789, 1812 (2010). 
141. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that today's 
globalized world "requires modem and effective legal institutions and codes, and it also 
requires a widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values underlying these 
institutions and codes"). 
142. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. Rev. 857, 858 (2005) 
(advisor to the CPA acknowledging about the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan that 
"constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow of the gun"). 
143. See Conference: From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effort to Establish Market 
Democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan: Panel 2: Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171, 175 (2004) (describing general approach as "elite pact-
making"); Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal 
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 707-08 (2004); Randall T. Coyne, Reply to Noah 
Feldman: Escaping Victor's Justice by the Use of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 
58 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 11 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, What's in a Name? Reflections on 
Timing, Naming and Constitution-Making, 49 WM AND MARY L. Rev. 1249, 1272-74 
(2008). 
144. Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History, 
40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2007) (American legal advisers in Iraq remarking: "There has 
been considerable speculation by the press, by non-governmental organizations, and by Iraqi 
citizens themselves about why various provisions of the new Iraqi constitution look the way 
they do and about what they mean."); Bodansky, supra note 53, at 132; Daniel H. Cole, 
From Renaissance Poland to Poland's Renaissance, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2093 (1999) 
(stating that many years are required for a constitutional drafting process). 
145. Article 38, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of 
Iraq] of 2005 ( only permitting freedom of expression, peaceful demonstration, the press, and 
association if they do not infringe "public order and morality"). Another restriction on the 
right of free speech existed due to criminalizing criticisms to the new government. Paul von 
Zielbauer, Iraqi Journalists Add Laws to List of Dangers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/world/middleeast/29media.html? 
pagewanted=print&_r=O (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (This was ostensibly a draconian 
restriction and the Executive reasonably enforced the terms perhaps was a rule that could 
remove Iraq from the category of "democracy," unless a judiciary reasonably interpreted the 
terms). 
146. Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, The International Migration of Constitutional 
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Deeks and Burton, Legal Adviser and Deputy Legal Adviser at the US 
Embassy in Baghdad during the Iraqi constitution drafting process, 
detailed their advisory role during the drafting procedures, which 
included US officials writing formulations of constitutional text, 
submitting those drafts to CPA-appointed Iraqi leaders, and voicing 
concerns on behalf of the "U.S. Government" over the substance of the 
provisions. 147 
Critiques of the constitutional drafting process should actually be 
construed as a product of anteceding initiatives. Constitutionalism had 
already effectively been imposed by the CPA' s adoption of T AL 
provisions. 148 The process that traversed from the CPA's ultimatums to 
the constitutional drafting procedures can be interpreted as a semblance 
of "precommitment," which means "becoming committed, bound or 
obligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on 
future action . . . to influence someone else's choices." 149 Pre-
commitments open the prospect of path dependent behavior, which is a 
term in political science employed to describe how planting precursors 
to future action makes a desired outcome highly probable. 150 The CPA 
enacted T AL, which defined "precommitments" for the draft 
Constitution and the Constitution set a "precommitment" for future Iraqi 
governments even before an elected government took office. Indeed, 
the proposals for the Constitution were predominantly consistent with 
the CPA' s T AL mandates. 151 Deeks and Burton emphasize that 
Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An 
Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. Rev. 883, 892-94 (2006); Stilt, supra 
note 143, at 697. 
147. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 2, 8, 31; Feldman & Martinez, supra note 
146, at 919 (stating that the US role was "facilitating, not imposing, constitutional 
compromises"); Ashley S. Deeks, Iraq 's Constitution and the Rule of Law, 28 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 837, 838 (2007). 
148. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 895. 
149. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(2006). 
150. Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and events that 
prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse because the progression of the 
political or institutional consequence involves entrenched behavior, anteceding 
determinations, and an elevated cost of altering course. RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DA vm 
COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 
AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-29 (2002); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. Rev. 251, 251-53 (2000). 
151. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 7 (frequently referencing back to the TAL 
when describing the drafting and legislative history). A word search of the article retrieves 
98 instances of "T AL" and 40 instances of "CPA," often relating to Orders and Regulations, 
seemingly suggestive of the critical influence of the CPA on the constitutional drafting 
process. Id. A word search of another document written by constitutional advisors retrieves 
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constitutional language often "tracks precisely a phrase . . . of the 
T AL." 152 In fact, the T AL had been regarded as the "supreme law of 
Iraq" 153 and the interim constitution. 154 
Consequently, constitutional drafting procedures consisted of Iraqi 
factions principally lining up in opposition to or in support of the CPA' s 
T AL provisions, but because T AL provisions were often the same as the 
final constitutional text, compromises among Iraqi groups were 
apparently not considered. 155 Even with the populace's ambiguous 
understanding of the Constitution, 79% voted in support of the proposed 
constitution in the October 2005 national referendum vote. 156 However, 
the ratification vote may have been an expedient reception facilitated by 
a desire to shed the occupation more precipitously than a testament to a 
rational analysis of the content of the Constitution. 157 Iraq's 
Constitution was not an autonomous product of the self-determination 
of the Iraqi people, but instead was a foreign transplant framework that 
remained alien to the society and befuddled Iraqis for years after the 
ratification. 158 
110 uses of"TAL." Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 883. 
152. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 43, 54, 60-61, 75 (citing examples). 
153. Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, International and Comparative Perspectives on 
Defamation, Free Speech, and Privacy: Also Inside: Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq: 
Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269, 274 
(2005-06) (stating that "Article 3(C) makes the TAL the supreme law oflraq."). 
154. Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, remarked before the 
Constitution was adopted: "No Iraqi wanted the American Civil Administrator to sign a 
document called an Iraqi constitution. Thus rather the [TAL] .. .in fact is Iraq's interim 
constitution." al-Istrabadi, supra note 153, at 270; Jackson, supra note 143, at 1273. 
155. Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 51 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 534, 546 (2006/07) ("the TAL, in spite ofrepeated violations, and in a 
very crude way regulated the subsequent process of transitional government formation and 
constitution-making"). 
156. Note, supra note 135, at 1205. 
157. Arato, supra note 155, at 551; Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, 
Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul ... : 
Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1139, 1139 (2008) ("new 
constitutional structure has not been able to ameliorate, and may even have exacerbated, a 
problem of instability and political disintegration."); Bejesky, Politico, supra note 92, at 105 
(Iraqis favored a withdrawal of the occupation) (citing to a list of polls that affirmed that 
approximately 80 percent oflraqis were opposed to the continuing occupation). Program on 
Int'l Policy Attitudes, What the Iraqi Public Wants: A Worldopinion.org Poll, WORLD 
PUBLIC OPrNION 4 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/lraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015) (In January 2006, 87% of Iraqis wanted a timeline for withdrawal, with 64% of 
Kurds, 90% Shia, and 94% Sunnis supporting withdrawal.. .Overall, 47% of Iraqis 
supported attacks on U.S. troops, with 16% of Kurds, 41% of Shia, and 88% Sunnis 
supporting attacks on U.S. troops). 
158. lntisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. 
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Despite the pitfalls inherent in not ensuring that there was 
widespread domestic sentiment of ownership over the process, many 
constitutional provisions were soundly designed, such as those articles 
that promoted pluralism, federalism, and equality. 159 Pluralism and 
equality are consistent with democratization and institutions designed to 
bolster human rights. Federalism can respect geographical distinctions 
across a population that coincide with religious, linguistic, and ethnic 
differences; accommodate local diversity in law and policy; check the 
central level; and boost participation in democratic processes. 160 
Adopting federal institutions is a prudent choice for a country with 
sharp divisions across geographically concentrated population with 
approximately 15-20% Sunnis, 15-20% Kurds, and 60-65% Shi'ites161 
and the CPA imposed a federal structure in Article 4 of the T AL twenty 
months prior to constitutional reform. 162 However, trade-offs in 
decentralizing Iraq into a duel-sovereignty system might have reduced 
the prospect of more exceptional nationality unity 163 and protracted 
discord on formidable choices, including on reconciling the sharing of 
geographically concentrated oil reserves and on determinations over 
CONST. L. 527, 528 (2008) ("More than two years after this ratification, there has been little 
to no headway toward detailing the mechanisms to be employed for fleshing out Iraq's 
constitutional skeleton."); Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Building: 
An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281, 289 (2008) (stating that there can be disconcertment in 
a population if nation-building constitutionalism is imposed and informal practice is 
inconsistent with new institutions). 
159. IRAQICONST.atpmbl.arts. l, 14. 
160. Robinson, supra note 136, at 679 (noting that Federalism can check concentrated 
government power.) Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("Just as the separation 
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent 
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between 
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front."). 
161. Iraq Poll: Note on Methodology, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2008), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=4443992 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Federalism, Not Partition, WASH. POST (OCT. 3, 2007), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007 /10/02/ 
AR2007100201824.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) ( explaining that external advocates 
favored a decentralized system of power sharing in Iraq that would elevate sub-national 
power); Peter W. Gailbraith, Op-Ed, Make Walls, Not War, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /10/23/opinion/23galbraith.html (last visited Apr. 
1, 2015) ( favoring partition). 
162. Law of Administration for the State oflraq for the Transitional Period, supra note 
121,art.4. 
163. See Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 898, 914; Note, supra note 135, at 
1203; Scott Malcomson & Michael Zumot, Iraq 's Kurds: Toward an Historic 
Compromise?, lNT'L CRISIS GROUP (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2004/mena/iraqs-kurds-
toward-an-historic-compromise.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
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whether oil production decisions should be governed at the federal or 
local level. 164 With the insurgency led by ISIS, which reportedly has 
claimed its own Caliphate where Sunnis reside in western Iraq, and 
Kurdish demands for more regional autonomy in northern Iraq, there is 
an intensified struggle for those who seek to keep Iraq unified. 165 
III. INTERPRETATIONS TO RECONCILE OCCUPATION LAW 
WITH CPA DIRECTIVES 
A. Theoretical and Legal Interpretations 
The restrictive view of occupation law, which is the near-
universally-accepted treaty framework that has been applicable for most 
of this century, does not accord an occupying military with a 
prerogative to transmute law and state institutions, but instead requires 
preserving existing institutions. 166 Moreover, the modem international 
law on occupation, which includes the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions, 167 does not depend upon whether there is a belligerent or 
non-belligerent occupation or how the occupier classifies itself, 168 but 
164. Vanessa J. Jimenez, Iraq's Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road 
Ahead, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 21, 23 (2005) (noting that Federalism could lead to more 
subnational control over property rights and natural resources, and that the success of 
federal structure is particularly dependent on the resource allocations); Christopher Helman, 
How Iraq's Kurds May be the Unlikely Losers in the !SIS Chaos, FORBES (June 12, 2014), 
available at http: //www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/06/ 12/how-iraqs-kurds-
may-be-the-unlikely-losers-in-the-isis-chaos/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that even 
Kurds have had lasting disputes over the central level's monopolization of the licensing 
system). 
165. Two Arab Countries Fall Apart, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604230-extreme-islamist-group-
seeks-create-caliphate-and-spread-jihad-across (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting that the 
most contentious and extreme position of the occupation was partition into three separate 
countries, which was proposed to quell violence); Andrew George, We Had to Destroy the 
Country to Save It: On the Use of Partition To Restore Public Order During Occupation, 48 
VA.J.INT'LL.187, 187(2007). 
166. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 859 (stating that principles of self-determination and 
autonomy were the "crucial parts of the very phenomenon of democratic constitutional ism 
itself."). 
167. Youngjin Jung, In Pursuit of Reconstructing Iraq: Does Se(f-Determination 
Matter?, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & Pol'y 391, 394 (2005). 
168. JEFFREY DUNOFF, INTERNATIONAL LAW 590 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that the 
occupier may be reluctant to accept the restrictions and duties that occupation law imposes); 
Gregory Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 231 (2005) (stating that 
many occupying powers during the twentieth century refused to admit that they were 
"occupiers" and instead stated that they lacked "requisite control over the occupied 
territory."). 
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instead the Conventions apply to any partial or full foreign military 
occupation of another country, 169 which means that the restrictions on 
the military occupation of Iraq governed as soon as the U.S. and U.K. 
invaded Iraq and controlled territory. 170 
The Security Council provided language in Resolution 1483 that 
approximated a contextually-specific interpretation of the restrictive 
view of occupation law, an explication of the "Authority's" obligation 
to preserve and protect, 171 and affirmed that it was imperative to address 
the humanitarian crisis, which unfolded due to the invasion itself. 
Hence, with clear international law provisions governing occupation, 
but with the CPA occupation disregarding rules of occupation law and 
assuming excessive liberty with interpreting the language of Security 
Council Resolution 1483, and without the Security Council or any other 
actor preventing or halting the CPA's initiatives or imposing liability, 
scholars offered many provocative explanations to reconcile how to 
classify the CPA's precedent172 and the possible impact on the 
customary international law of occupation. 
At one end of the spectrum, historical doctrines accentuate a 
victorious military's unconditional prerogative during occupation. 173 
The ancient doctrine of debellatio represents that a conqueror takes title 
to the subjugated adversary's territory, 174 establishes "fundamental 
169. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Convention (IV)] 
("The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases 
of partial or total occupation of a territory ... even if the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance."). 
170. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 842. 
171. See infra Part III (B). 
172. Naomi Burke, A Change in Perspective: Looking at Occupation Through the 
Lens of the Law of Treaties, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 103, 114 (2008); Jean L. Cohen, 
The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post 
Bel/um/or "Interim Occupations", 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 496, 500 (2006-07). 
173. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 59th Sess., May 7-June 5, July 9-Aug. 10 2007, 
U.N. Doc. A/62/10 at para. 324(b)(ii) (discussing occupation following armed conflict); 
PAUL K. MACDONALD, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF PERIPHERAL CONQUEST IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 185-86 (2014) (discussing Iraq as a case of peripheral conquest, 
but was not similar to Britain's quest to acquire a global empire). 
174. Patterson, supra note 33, at 467; GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF 
ENEMY TERRITORY 7 (1957)( discussing historical rule); Perez, supra note 128, at 60. The 
historic claim to property with debellatio meant that there was full "extermination in war of 
one belligerent by another through annexation of the former's territory after conquest, the 
enemy forces having been annihilated." 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
DISPUTE§ 264, at 470-71 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed., 1963)(1905). 
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institutional changes to the government of an enemy nation," takes 
actions to alleviate the potential continuing threat posed by that country, 
and provides for the population. 175 The CPA assuredly did not seize 
title to conquered land, 176 which eliminates a key prerogative 
characteristic of debellatio, but the incidence of other factors makes the 
CPA' s unilateral dictates approximate circumstances surrounding the 
period that immediately followed the downfall of colonial empires. 
During the early-twentieth century and pursuant to the League of 
Nation's territorial trusteeship system, 177 the military occupier 
possessed a "sacred trust" justification for temporary governance over a 
foreign population in order to assist the foreign population with self-
governance. 178 
The CPA's actions were comparable to the "territorial trusteeship" 
system, but some distinctions are that the occupation of Iraq followed 
after a one-sided war and not colonial rule, there has been a conclusive 
renunciation of the appalling self-righteousness that pervaded 
colonialism, 179 a dictated occupation may not be accordant with a 
trusteeship, 180 and the Mandate and Trusteeship systems were racist 
concepts that classified certain people as "uncivilized" and unworthy of 
possessing "sovereignty." 181 Decolonization thoroughly repudiated this 
discriminatory distinction between sophisticated and simpleton 
175. John Yoo, Iraqi Reconstruction and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 8 (2004). 
176. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (affirming self-determination). 
177. Deiwert, supra note 46, at 772-73. 
178. League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 1 ("To those colonies and territories 
which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States 
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this 
Covenant."). 
179. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. N5217 
(1970); TATAH MENTAN, THE STATE IN AFRICA 157 (2010) (stating that "[t]here is a general 
consensus among Africanist historians that colonialism is morally wrong."); see generally 
ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 31, 34 (2006); CHALMERS JOHNSON, 
THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 29 (2004); THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE 
PRINCIPAL ORGANS 142 (Paul Graham Taylor & A.J.R. Groom eds. , 2000); UDAY SIGH 
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL 
THOUGHT (1999); Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony 
and the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677 (2004); Thomas M. 
Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council 
Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 51 (2001). 
180. Wilde, supra note 3 7, at 109. 
181. Id. at 94. 
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populations on which the trusteeship system depended, 182 making the 
conception decidedly anachronistic in the twenty-first century. 
Perhaps the most compelling interpretation that justifies significant 
leeway in instituting reform is one that affirms the restrictions of the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, but incorporates universal human 
rights prescriptions as a fundamental goal of an occupation. In this 
sense, the history of occupation law is not as salient as reconciling the 
development of international convention rules governing }us post 
helium in conjunction with the chronological introduction of modern 
human rights values, which is a diagnostic synthesis of codified law and 
subsequent custom that may still ultimately result in a transformative or 
"nation-building" occupation. 183 
Professor Feldman, who was a constitutional advisor to the Iraqi 
Governing Council, believed that a minimalist intrusion in domestic 
affairs should be followed during an occupation, but emphasized that a 
"government may permissibly set its goals on the basis of its own 
citizens' interests whenever those goals do not fundamentally conflict 
with the interests of people whom the government does not 
represent."184 Offering an interpretation for applicability to the 
occupation, Professor Purdy notes that this philosophy is a spin on the 
application of the John Stuart Mill "harm principle" to international 
affairs, in which "one may act freely so long as one's actions do not 
harm another," but Purdy also accentuates the deficits in this 
interpretation, including that one "cannot have perfect knowledge" of 
others' "interests" or appreciate which interests should be most 
authoritative. 185 Moreover, commentators might also disagree over 
whether there should be a presumed intention that the occupier aspires 
to fulfill a philanthropic mission or whether the international 
community should acquiesce to the foreign military's disposition that 
occupation law restrictions would only unduly hamper the fuzzy and 
182. WILLIAM BAIN, BETWEEN ANARCHY AND SOCIETY: TRUSTEESHIP AND THE 
0BLIGA TIONS OF POWER 135-36 (2003). 
183. DANIEL LEVY & NATAN SZNAIDER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEMORY 25-26 (2010) 
( emphasizing that there is a dearth of theorizing on human rights in the context of nation-
building, but that "human rights are about the breakdown of boundaries"); see also Boon, 
supra note 126, at 57 (noting that while interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in 
transformative occupations, there is "no uniform legal framework regulating transitions 
from conflict to peace," but that rules of jus post helium fill the void); Norchi, supra note 
158, at 281. 
184. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION 
BUILDING 24 (2004). 
185. Jedediah Purdy, Review Essay: The Ethics of Empire, Again, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 
1773, 1779 (2005). 
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warmly regarded goodwill mission. 186 Fact-specific exigencies may not 
be the most favorable circumstances for establishing new customary 
international law norms, but this position has been raised by 
commentators with reference to the occupation oflraq. 187 
B. Interpreting the Terms of Resolution 1483 in Light of Contemporary 
Occupation Law 
Theorization and contentions that practice may have updated 
custom should also include the language of Resolution 1483, which 
defined the occupation's authority, and appraise how scrupulously the 
186. McGurk, supra note 131, at 452 (working lawyer for the CPA remarking that "we 
often encountered hard ceilings on the limits of our authority under international law" but 
that his experience "revealed an inexcusable gulf between what international law clearly 
permits and what any successful state-building operation requires."). The connotation that 
there is a fuzzy and warmly regarded do-gooder presence that should remain beyond 
reproach is a theoretical conception; MACDONALD, supra note 173, at 186 (noting that 
"states' intentions [such as if they are assumed to be noble] are largely irrelevant when 
assessing whether a particular act qualifies as an act of conquest"); Roberts, supra note 94, 
at 601 (remarking of the depiction of the occupant as a bastion of progress can beget a 
"dangerous mix of crusading, self-righteousness, and self-delusion"). Others have raised 
questions over what is "lawful" under international law and what is "legitimate," including 
by maintaining that occupation rules are outmoded because these particular actions in Iraq 
involved "nation-building." Harris, supra note 32, at 3; Cohen, supra note 172, at 496, 500. 
Others have suggested that sovereignty can fracture because it was never really absolute. 
Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195, 
196 (2004). 
187. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at xi ( contending that even though CPA actions in 
Iraq were not consistent with occupation law, the precedent may update occupation law). A 
"transformative occupation" may represent an evolution in occupation law since the era in 
which international agreements were consummated. Roberts, supra note 94, at 580; Nehal 
Bhuta, The Antimonies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 721, 740 (2005). 
Army JAG attorney Major Nicholas F. Lancaster also suggests that principles of customary 
international occupation law and the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention may 
have been replaced by new customary standards as a result of a "Coalition occupation and 
administration of Iraq." Major Nicholas F. Lancaster, Occupation Law, Sovereignty, and 
Political Transformation: Should the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions Still be Considered Customary International Law?, 189 ARMY L. REV. 51 , 51 
(2006). Other commentators have maintained that there are other recent examples of 
practice modifying custom. Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look 
at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. 
Rev. 143, 144 (2001) (contending that even though Article 52(2) of the Geneva Convention 
strictly limits attacks to military targets and objectives, because these rules have not always 
been followed, violations are not indicative of a breach of international law but instead that 
the treaty rule "may not necessarily reflect customary international law or state practice."). 
A possible limitation in this contention is that breach examples, which contradict customary 
practice (World War I and World War 11), precede the 1949 treaty provision. Id. at 153-62 
(providing examples). However, Human rights Watch and Amnesty International have 
criticized bombing tactics in the former Yugoslavia during the late-l 990s. Id. at 165-66, 
176-77. 
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CPA adhered to the Resolution. Depending on the level of compliance, 
perhaps questions should not fixate on what occupation law is or how 
occupation law has evolved, but on why Bush administration rhetoric 
prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483 maintained one representation, 
why Bush's CPA departed from those representations, 188 and how the 
parameters of Resolution 1483 were averted without consequence. 
These reflections do not venture to imply that the U.N. could not permit 
the Security Council to impose a deep occupation authority on an 
unwilling target state, 189 but queries whether that authorization was in 
fact located in the text of Resolution 1483. 
Resolution 1483 specifically called the U.K. and the U.S. "the 
Authority" and "occupying powers," referenced the applicability of the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions, and specified that the Authority was 
obliged to "recognize the specific authorities, responsibilities, and 
obligations under applicable international law . . . as occupying 
powers."190 Not one word in Resolution 1483 refers to "the Authority" 
or any faction of the occupation to embark on any form of 
"legislating."191 In the six times that the Resolution refers to 
"institutions" and the equivalent of law-making initiatives, the language 
is surrounded by affirmations that it is the Iraqi people who will 
determine their "own political future" and that all U.N. members, U.N. 
organs, and "the Authority" were required to assist Iraqis in establishing 
their own institutions. 192 Thus, aside from the occupying authority's 
right to make rule modifications or adopt certain laws as necessary to 
ensure public order and safety during the occupation, 193 uphold human 
rights, and assist the fruition of a representative Iraqi government that 
188. See infra Parts II (A)(C). 
189. The legitimacy of such a delegation could be more robust to the extent that the 
Security Council's specific mission endeavors to maintain peace and security and also 
weighs the respective infringement on internal governance. 
190. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (emphasis 
added); see Boon, supra note 118, at 535-36. 
191. S.C. RES. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
192. Id. at pmbl. paras. 1, 7, 8(c), 8(e) 15; Harris, supra note 32, at 1 (stating that the 
Security Council, without reservation, affirmed that the Iraqi people were to possess 
sovereign control of their own choices). 
193. Convention (IV), supra note 169, art. 64 (permitting the occupying power to 
"subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable 
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain an 
orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power."); 
Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 43 (providing that the occupier must ensure that there 
is "public order and safety" and must respect the laws of the country unless absolutely 
prevented from doing so); Boon, supra note 53, at 324 (remarking that the occupier has 
some authority to legislate). 
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would make its own legal choices, there was no unilateral prerogative in 
Resolution 1483 that permitted the "Authority" to reform Iraq's legal 
system. 194 Resolution 1483 required the U.S. and U.K. to "promote the 
welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of the 
territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of 
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in 
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political 
future." 195 It is the political future that selects the legal future. That is 
how democracy works. 
Despite the language, some commentators have maintained that 
Resolution 1483 did sanction widespread reforms. For example, Bart 
Fisher, an attorney who founded the U.S.-Iraq Business Council in April 
2002, explains that he specializes in assisting American businesspersons 
who want to invest in Iraq and believed that Iraq should have taken full 
advantage of the benefits of foreign investment and privatization, and 
remarked: 
As far as privatizing Iraq, a regime has been established. As the occupying power, 
we have great discretion under the CPA. U.N. Resolution 1483 actually provides 
the authority to promote economic reconstruction and we have operated under this 
resolution. If fact, operating under the Resolution is a matter of international law. 
Occupying powers have broad discretion to change the laws of the country to ensure 
that it functions. The first pillar is to establish an investment law. 96 
194. U.S. DEP'T ARMY, supra note 34, at preface, para. 2, 4 ("the 
occupant. .. continue[ s] [ to administer and enforce] the ordinary civil and penal laws of the 
occupied territories except to the extent [that] it may be authorized by Article 64 [of the 
Geneva Convention] ... and Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations] to alter, suspect or repeal 
such laws."); Scheffer, supra note 33, at 845-49 (stating that Resolution 1483 did fall within 
occupation law and occupation law "was never designed for such transforming exercises."). 
195. S.C. RES. 1483, preamble para 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
196. Bart S. Fisher, Symposium: Markets in Transition: Reconstruction and 
Development: Part One - Reconstruction: Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia 
and Performance for China: Investing in Iraq: Legal and Political Aspects, 18 TRANSNAT'L 
LAW 71, 73 (2004). (Fisher is correct in that this was the CPA's actions, but where that 
authority came from is a mystery. Similarly, if one reads half of Article 47, one can say that 
the "occupying power may introduce changes, 'as the result of the occupation of a territory, 
into the institutions or government of the said territory."' However, a complete quote of 
Art. 4 7 actually states that "protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be 
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present 
Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the 
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the 
authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power." Regulations Respecting 
the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. Reading 
the entire provision denotes that an occupation must meet a very high threshold before it can 
introduce changes to the institutions of the occupied territory because any modification is 
almost guaranteed to disadvantage at least one protected person. In terms of human rights 
protections or democratization, one can make a legitimate argument that equally respected 
and protected citizens are not politically disadvantaged, but to maintain that an occupation's 
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Fisher represented what the CPA did. Likewise, Feisal Amin al-
Istrabadi, Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N., admitted that Bremer and the 
CPA exercised all lawmaking authority and states: "Resolution 1483 
derogated this principle [ that an occupier cannot change the occupied 
country's legal system] by giving sweeping powers to the Civil 
Administrator." 197 Resolution does affirm that the occupation was 
authorized to administrate the government's affairs 198 and to assist 
Iraqis in developing their own representative government institutions, 199 
which was reasonably interpreted as an implied right to initiate the 
democratic reform process. 200 Administrate does not mean legislate. 
Having read Resolution 1483 several times in an attempt to specifically 
locate broader discretion, this author remains perplexed and continues 
to believe that the CPA was never given any special authority in 
Resolution 1483 to unilaterally legislate. 
economic changes will not disadvantage certain segments of the population is not 
compelling). 
197. al-Istrabadi, supra note 153, at 270; Yoo, supra note 175, at 12-13, 16 
(referencing the fact that the Geneva and Hague Conventions are binding and that 
Resolution 1483 is binding on the occupation and citing provisions of those conventions 
relating to administering and "providing public services and maintaining security"). 
198. Hmoud, supra note 107, at 449-50 (stating that, specifically, the CPA assumed 
responsibility over the Oil-for-Food program from the United Nations and established the 
Development Fund for Iraq which permitted using the funds to administrate and for 
reconstruction). 
199. Parsons, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that "U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1483, recognizing the state of occupation after the fact, stated that the law of occupation 
applied to the U.S. and Great Britain in Iraq, while at the same time allowing the 
transformation of Iraq into a democratic nation."); Yoo, supra note 175, at 7 (referencing 
"the authority of the United States, under domestic and international law, to make 
fundamental changes to the constitutional law and government institutions oflraq."). 
200. Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An 'Empire of Law' or the 
'Law of Empire'?, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 811, 820, 820 n.40 (2009) ("At least during the 
period prior to installation of an Iraqi government, the Security Council also gave the United 
States and the United Kingdom, as occupying powers, implicit permission to reform Iraqi 
institutions to the extent necessary to bring about democratic institutions" and pointing to 
the preamble and paragraphs 4 and 8 of Resolution 1483); Scheffer, supra note 33, at 845-
46 (the resolutions "invited the Authority to act beyond some of the barriers that occupation 
law otherwise would impose on occupying powers."); Cohen, supra note 172, at 500, 511 
(stating that the language of Resolution 1483 seems ambiguous under occupation law as it 
requires promoting "economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable 
development" and for "the protection of human rights," which suggests legislating could be 
necessary and/or implied). This point does reference the most interpretable language of the 
seven-page resolution, but it refers to a UN Special Representative for Iraq" who should 
work with "the Authority" to "assist the people of Iraq" in promoting these missions, but it 
does not state that the "Authority" should take any initiative on its own or make choices for 
the Iraqi people or appointed puppets. S.C. Res. 1483, at 8(e) (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
If one maintains that there are carte blanche occupation 
prerogatives and that there is an evolution of the customary 
international law by occupation as a result of the occupation of Iraq, 
perhaps the consequence of the CPA' s reforms should be considered. 
Violence was a hallmark of the occupation, the overwhelming majority 
of Iraqis opposed the occupation, Iraqis were infuriated by the CPA 
reforms,201 and now, in mid-2014, Iraq faces another critical turning 
point. Divisions have intensified with Sunni insurgencies and Kurds 
expressing acerbity with Prime Minister Maliki, the long-term Iraqi 
exile and eight-year prime minister, who has presided as a brutal 
dictator 202 pursuant to the institutions initially installed by the CPA. 
This practical result further evinces that the most favorable 
interpretation of occupier powers is to adhere to the restrictions of 
occupation law and to not assume that there is legitimate precedent that 
has altered the customary international law of occupation. The people 
should commonly recognize that they formulated the trajectory for their 
political and legal future because that is self-determination. 
While the governing treaties only permit an occupier to discharge 
functions necessary to administer the country and nothing more, 203 
persuasive arguments can be made that the international law of 
occupation does now permit an occupier to impose institutional reform 
that will allow the local population to enjoy cogent human rights and 
representative govemment,204 particularly when these are optimal 
201. See Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 279-98); see 
generally Robert Bejesky, A Ripe Foundation for the Formation of ISIS: Tit-for-Tat 
Hostilities and Contingently Contained Violence (Working Paper June 2015). 
202. See supra Introduction. 
203. GALLEN, supra note 48, at 62 (noting that the intention behind occupier 
administrative duties in the law of occupation was to only permit "[t]he occupier . .. to 
administer territory in a conservative fashion, only enforcing legal changes where necessary 
to maintain peace and security" and to "promote local capacity for autonomous self-
government"); see also VON GLAHN, supra note 174, at 139-41; HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (Dieter Fleck ed. , 1995). Moreover, the 
invasion of Iraq was not approved by the Security Council and was called a violation of 
international law. Robert Bejesky, A Theorization on Equity: Tracing Causal Responsibility 
for Missing Iraqi Antiquities and Piercing Official Immunity, 27 PACE INT'L L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 39-41). There was a progressively deepening intention 
for occupation involving a unilaterally conceived British and American mission, designed 
for disarmament of prohibited weapons. However, this then expanded into removing 
Saddam Hussein and his top officials from power, and then into removing tens of thousands 
of identifiable Baathe officials from government. See Clair Dyer, Occupation of Iraq 
Illegal, Blair Told, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2003, 7:18 AM), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/may/22/uk.iraq2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
204. See supra Introduction. 
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conditions to ensure the populace is able to freely choose its own laws. 
It is much more controversial to assume that an occupier can impose a 
large-scale economic and social restructuring to implant a capitalist 
free-for-all that upsets an existing socioeconomic order. One can raise a 
variety of novel and extemporaneous claims of vague quasi-de Jure 
authority205 that existed beyond the very limited prerogative in 
Resolution 1483 because the Hague rules do permit an occupier to act in 
concert with temporary governing authorities. The problem is that 
occupiers absolutely do not possess the sovereign authority of the 
regime that was ousted, 206 cannot obtain any authority above a 
temporary de facto administrative authority, 207 and cannot exercise 
rights of sovereignty, 208 and all of the temporary governance bodies 
were appointed by and beholden to the CPA. 209 
Circumstances have evolved since The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions were adopted, but if anything, it would appear that the era 
of decolonization furthered a population's right of self-determination to 
pursue its own interests without being paternalistically coddled by a 
205. S.C. Res. 1511, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) ("The Governing 
Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, 
without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq 
during the transitional period until an internationally recognized, representative government 
is established and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority."). By the terms of this 
resolution, the appointed Governing Council was not de Jure, but the resolution offers lip 
service to de facto authority. However, the Governing Council was not exercising de facto 
authority because the CPA was the entity with sovereign control and the Governing Council 
had no independent existence apart from the CPA. The Governing Council's existence was 
probably more similar to the functioning of presidential appointments in the US. The 
CPA's own mission statement identified itself as the temporary, "lawful government of 
Iraq." Michael A. Newton, The Iraqi High Criminal Court: controversy and contributions, 
88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 399, 417 (June 2006). Pursuant to Order No. 1, The CPA "vested 
[itself] with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its 
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 
Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war." Coalition Provision Authority, 
Reg. No. l, sec. 1(2), CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/200305 l 6 _ CP AREG _ l _The_ Coalition _Provisiona 
I_ Authority.pdf (last visited Apr. l, 2015). The ruling organizational chart depicted the 
Pentagon and the CPA, and the CPA directing various US and British generals and 
diplomats for their respective responsibilities, and the JGC was subordinate to all relevant 
actors. NOAM CHOMSKY, IMPERIAL AMBITIONS 46 (2005); see contra al-Istrabadi, supra note 
153, at 270, 274 (Iraqi UN representative suggesting that the CPA had some amorphous de 
Jure authority but then alternatively described that "Iraq's sovereignty was dormant for a 
time"). 
206. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (H. Lauterpacht, ed. 1952). 
207. See Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of 
Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1581 (1985); Boon, supra note 53, at 296. 
208. Burke, supra note 172, at 109-111. 
209. Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 279-98). 
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foreign intervention or by subjecting a population to a system similar to 
a League of Nations' mandate. It is offensive to assume that a 
population does not really "understand" its own real interests and 
requires assistance to learn how to be "civilized," as this postulate is 
akin to the same strain of loathsome intermeddling that sustained 
colonialism, but has since been universally repudiated. As for imposing 
laws because Iraqis do not comprehend legitimate legal structure, an 
Iraqi judge opined: 
We don't need you to come here and tell us about what law is. We invented law .... 
We are the people who figured law out, thousands of years ago. But now your 
soldiers are coming in and telling us what to do, and you're not respecting our legal 
traditions or legal process. The first thing the Americans did after the war was to 
announce that they were immune from Iraqi legal process. So, if an American 
commits a crime, they're completely immune, there's nothing that we can do about 
it. The Americans are unaccountable. How can this be the rule of law? 21 
210. Bodansky, supra note 53, at 130. 
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